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NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF GUARANTY CONTRACTS

Richard F. Dole, Jr.*
HERE are three types of notice which a creditor-offeree may be
required to give a guarantor-offeror: (1) notice of intention to
accept the offer of guaranty, (2) notice of transactions in reliance on
the offer of guaranty, and (3) notice of the principal's failure to perform the obligation guaranteed. Litigation has been rife with regard to these notice requirements. Corbin has stated:

T

"The question of notice as a condition precedent has been
litigated more extensively in connection with contracts of suretyshi p than in any other field. A superficial examination of
hundreds of cases may seem to indicate a tremendous conflict
of authority. It is believed, however, that a careful analysis and
classification of the cases will bring order out of chaos and will
show that the courts have been acting with a reasonable degree
of uniformity and consistency." 1
Corbin, however, did not attempt to analyze and classify the cases.
The following is an attempt to verify Corbin's educated guess
through the application of factual analysis. If significant facts can
be isolated which produce the same result regardless of the theory
applied by the court, no real conflict can be said to exist. An initial
exploration of the problems involved is a prerequisite to delineating the area in which factual analysis must be used.

I.

SURVEY OF THE PROBLEM

Contractual guaranties arise from dealings between the guarantor and the creditor. They may exist without the consent, or even
the knowledge, of the principal.2 Although the creditor frequently
requests a guaranty,3 his solicitation seldoms amounts to an offer.
The contract commonly results from acceptance by the creditor of
• Member of the Maine and New York Bars.-Ed. The author is indebted to Professor
Rudolf B. Schlesinger and the 1961 Seminar of the General Principles of Law Project at
the Cornell Law School for encouragement in the preparation of this article, which was
submitted to the faculty of the Cornell Law School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the LL.M. degree.
1 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 726, at 393-94 (1960) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN; Vol. 1
(1950); Vol. 3A (1960)].
2 Sec REsrATEMENT, SECURITY § 83, comment b (1941).
8 See Campbell, Notice Due a Guarantor, 35 MICH. L. R.Ev. 529, 535 (1937) [hereinafter
cited as Campbell].
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an offer made by the guarantor. 4 It may be bilateral or unilateral,
though bilateral contracts of guaranty are rare. 5
An offer for a bilateral contract of guaranty may request the
creditor to promise the guarantor that he will or will not act with
respect to the principal. For example, the creditor may be asked to
promise not to press the principal on a debt. The creditor may be
expressly directed by the offer to give notice to the guarantor as a
condition precedent to formation of a bilateral contract or as a
condition subsequent to its existence. On the other hand, such
notice may be expressly dispensed with by the offer. When the offer
does not refer to notice, principles relating to the formation and
discharge of contracts provide a solution. Communication of the
creditor's promise to the guarantor is ordinarily necessary to form
a bilateral contract of guaranty. 6 Notice of the creditor's performance of his promise or of the principal's failure to pay him is not
needed to prevent discharge of the contract.
Similarly, an offer for a unilateral contract of guaranty may
specify as consideration action or inaction by the creditor or a
promise by the creditor running to the principal. For example,
the creditor may be asked to extend credit to the principal or to
promise the principal that he will do so. The creditor may be expressly charged by the offer to send notice to the guarantor as a
condition precedent to formation of a unilateral contract or as a
condition subsequent to its existence. Conversely, such notice may
be expressly negatived by the offer. When the offer does not mention notice, principles relating to the formation and discharge of
contracts furnish an answer. The creditor need not communicate
to the guarantor his intention to perform the requested act in
order to create a unilateral contract of guaranty.7 Neither notice of
the creditor's performance nor notice of the principal's default is
essential to forestall the contract's discharge.
When the offer is silent concerning notice, conventional principles have not always been followed. At times the creditor has been
compelled to give the guarantor notice in order to bind him to his
promise. At other times no notice has been required.
4

See 1

CORBIN §

68, at 215.

5 See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
WILLISTON].
6

7

See 1 WILLISTON § 70.
See id. § 68.

69A, at 221-22 (3d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as
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A. Nature of the Notice Requirements
All three notice requirements are conditions of the guarantor's
liability. They are not promises creating a legal duty in the creditor
and a right in the guarantor. They are operative facts which must
exist for certain contracts of guaranty to be enforceable. 8 Conditions may be express, implied, or constructive. The guarantor
creates an express condition when he uses definite language in the
offer to limit his liability.9 An implied condition is based on a mutual understanding of the parties that is not expressed in definite
language. 10 In contrast, a constructive condition is a circumstance
which is treated as a condition on grounds of fairness and justice
although the parties have manifested no intention whatever with
regard to it.11
The distinctions between the various types of conditions are
clear; but in specific cases it is not always easy to classify the particular condition involved. Literal classification aside, in a sense all
facts stated to be conditions by courts are constructive conditions
unless the parties expressly and explicitly made them conditions.
Considerations of fairness and reasonableness, the essence of constructive conditions, are given considerable weight in interpreting
the words and actions of the parties.12 The subsequent analysis
will treat notice as a constructive condition in this broader sense.
B. Distinctions Between the Notice Requirements
Notice of intention to accept is notice to the guarantor by the
creditor that the latter intends to extend credit in reliance on the
guaranty. 13 Its purpose is to enable the guarantor to plan his affairs
intelligently.14 Notice of transactions is notice to the guarantor by
the creditor of the total balance due on the principal's account,15
and, according to some authorities, notice of the terms of payment
as well. 16 Notice of transactions, like notice of intention to accept,
aids the guarantor in the organization of his affairs. 17 Notice of
default is notice to the guarantor by the creditor that the principal
8 See 3A CORBIN § 627.
See id. § 631.
10 See ibid.
11 See id. § 632.
12 See id. § 639, at 58.
lS Lowe v. Beckwith, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 150 (1853).
H See Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113, 125 (1833).
111 Louisville Mfg. Co. v. Welch, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 461 (1850).
16 E.g., Craft v. Isham, 13 Conn. 28, 40 (1838).
17 See 1 STORY, CONTRACTS 360 (1st ed. 1844).

9
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has failed to perform the obligation guaranteed.18 The object of
notice of default is to safeguard the guarantor's rights of recourse. 10
Notice of intention to accept, notice of transactions, and notice
of default all constitute requirements which must be met in some,
but not all, contracts of guaranty. They are imposed by the courts
as constructive conditions of the guarantor's liability on certain
contracts unless negatived by express terms. 20 Notice of intention
to accept, however, is the only type of notice that is necessarily contractual in theory. It is considered either a condition precedent to
formation of a contract21 or a condition precedent to the guarantor's duty of performance.22 Although notice of transactions and
notice of default are also referred to as constructive conditions of
the guarantor's liability,23 failure to dispatch these notices actually
operates as a suretyship defense, i.e., the guarantor is permitted
to offset against his contractual liability the amount of pecuniary
loss that he can link to the failure to receive notice.24
In theory, the notice requirements are due at different times.
Precise delineation may be more difficult as a practical matter.
Notice of intention to accept is due within a reasonable time after
commencement of performance by the creditor; 25 notice of trans18 Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113 (1833). The notice of default
to which a guarantor of payment may be entitled should be distinguished from notice of
inability to collect, which a creditor may be required to give a guarantor of collection. See
text accompanying notes 240-41 infra.
19 See Douglass v. Reynolds, supra note 18. If the principal has defaulted, the guarantor
can sue to require him to pay the creditor. See SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP § 46 (1950) [hereinafter
cited as S1MPSON]. Alternatively, the guarantor can pay the creditor and become subrogated
to the latter's rights and remedies as well as his security. Upon fulfillment of the principal's
obligation the guarantor also has a right to seek full reimbursement from the principal
and contribution from co-guarantors if he has paid more than his proportionate share of
the obligation guaranteed. See id. §§ 47-49. The guarantor assumes the risk of the insolvency
of the principal and his co-guarantors during the interim between default and exercise
of his rights of recourse. Notice of default limits the time during which the gparantor bears
this risk because of ignorance.
The notice of the creditor's inability to collect from the principal that may be due a
guarantor of collection serves a distinct function. Since the creditor's failure to collect
from the principal indicates that the guarantor's rights of recourse are already impaired,
this notice requirement is principally designed to avoid unnecessary litigation, i.e., to
, enable the guarantor of collection to meet his obligation on demand and thereby obviate
legal proceedings by the creditor. See R.EsTATEMENT, SECURITY, Explanatory Notes § 134
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1940).
20 See Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 CoLUM, L. REv. 903 (1942).
21 Davis v. Wells, 104 U.S. 159 (1881).
22 Bishop v. Eaton, 161 Mass. 496, 500, 37 N.E. 665, 667-68 (1894) (dictum).
23 See, e.g., 3A CORBIN § 726.
24 Louisville Mfg. Co. v. Welch, 51 U.S. (IO How.) 461, 474-75 (1850) (dictum).
25 Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113 (1833), as explained in
Louisville Mfg. Co. v. Welch, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 461, 474 (1850) (dictum).
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actions, within a reasonable time after the close of transactions; 26
and notice of default, within a reasonable time after the principal's
default. 27
II.

NoTICE OF INTENTION To AccEPT

A.

The English Rule
Lord Ellenborough inaugurated the concept of notice of intention to accept in 1813 when he held that it was a constructive
condition of the following offer:
"Gentlemen, as I understand Messrs. David Anderson and Co.,
of Quebec, have given you an order for rigging, & etc., which
will amount to about four thousand pounds, I can assure you,
from what I know of D. A.'s honor and probity, you will be
perfectly safe in crediting them to that amount; indeed I have
no objection to guaranty you against any loss from giving them
this credit.''28
The subsequent elaboration of this concept bears a striking similarity to the pattern of the American cases analyzed below.29 Notice
is a constructive condition in English and Commonwealth law
whenever the phrasing of the guaranty should indicate to the creditor that the guarantor expects notice or needs it in order to make
his plans.
Notice will be required when the offer indicates a willingness
to guaranty only if the creditor signifies his intention to accept.
Notice was required, for instance, when the guaranty stated: "If
you can arrange matters to your mutual satisfaction, I am sure that
Mr. Hugill will prove a very reliable person to deal with. I will
myself, with pleasure, become security for anything he may be disposed to give an order for." 30 Notice is also necessary when the offer
is extended to two or more prospective creditors and the guarantor
does not know which one will accept,31 and when the offer indicates
20 Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113 (1833). Notice of transactions
is due only once, regardless of whether a temporary or a continuing guaranty is involved.
Ibid. The former usually secures a single transaction; the latter, multiple transactions. See STEARNS, SuRETYSHIP § 4.7 (5th ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as STEARNS].
27 Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., supra note 26.
28 M'Iver v. Richardson, 1 M. &: S. 557, 105 Eng. Rep. 208 (1813).
20 See text accompanying notes 98-180 infra.
30 Kastner v. Winstanley, 20 U.C.C.P. 101, 101-02 (Can. 1869); accord Symmons v.
Want, 2 Stark 371, 171 Eng. Rep. 676 (1818) (alternative holding). But see A. A. Davison
Pty. Ltd. v. Seabrook, 37 Argus L.R. 156 (Viet. S.C. Austl. 1931).
31 Lott v. Collins, 8 S.C.R. 104 (N.S."W.S.C. Austl. 1869).
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that the guarantor is unsure that he is a suitable guarantor, e.g.,
when the offer names a reference who can vouch for the guarantor's
credit standing.32
Notice of intention to accept will not be demanded if the wording of the offer or the circumstances of the making of the offer
should indicate to the creditor that the guarantor does not expect
or need it. Thus, notice is unnecessary when the guarantor uses
positive words of guaranty even though he does not expressly waive
notice, for example: "Please pay to my tenant Imam Din whatever
money he requires and settle your account every harvest, because
he would require money for agricultural and seed purposes. I am
responsible for the amount borrowed by Imam Din." 33 Circumstances which should lead the guarantor to anticipate acceptance
are numerous. Illustrations include a request by the creditor to
the guarantor for the guaranty,34 and knowledge by the guarantor
that he is an acceptable guarantor and that his offer was taken by
the principal to a meeting at which it was expected that credit
would be extended.35 A request by the principal for the guaranty,
however, does not affect the guarantor's expectations of acceptance
unless he knows that the proposal originated with the creditor.36
Notice of intention to accept can be waived by failure to object
when the creditor tardily informs the guarantor that he intends to
hold him liable.37 The guarantor's seasonable knowledge of acceptance, although acquired from a source other than the creditor, is
the equivalent of notice of intention to accept.88

The Division of the American Authorities
The apparent conflict in the cases involves unilateral contracts
of guaranty, since it is accepted that the creditor's promise must be
communicated to the guarantor to form a bilateral contract of
guaranty.39 Treatise writers have attempted to mitigate the confusion concerning notice of intention to accept by isolating distinct
B.

32 Mozley v. Tinkler, 1 C.M. &: R. 692, 695-96, 149 Eng. Rep. 1258, 1260 (1835) (opinion
of Parke, B.).
83 Ranga Ram-Thakar Das v. Raghbir Singh, 1928 Lah. 938, 113 Indian Cas. 780 (India
1928); accord, Manning v. Mills, 12 U.C.Q.B. 515 (Can. 1855).
34 Oldershaw v. King, 2 H. &: N. 399,403, 157 Eng. Rep. 165, 167, rev'd on other grounds,
2 H. &: N. 517, 157 Eng. Rep. 213 (1857) (comment by Bromwell, B.); Fraser v. Douglas,
16 Man. Rep. 484, 487-88, 5 W.L.R. 52, 54-55 (Can. 1906) (dictum); see Jenkins v. Ruttan,
8 U.C.Q.B. 625 (Can. 1852).
85 See Luck v. Ilka, 1951 Q.S.R. 281 (Aust!. 1951).
36 Mozley v. Tinkler, 1 C.M. &: R. 692, 149 Eng. Rep. 1258 (1835).
87 Sorby v. Gordon, 30 L.T.R. (n.s.) 528 (Ex. 1874-).
38 Jays Ltd. v. Sala, 14 T.L.R. 461 (Q.B. 1898).
39 See 1 WILLISTON § 69A, at 219.

1963]

GUARANTY CONTRACTS

63

bodies. of authority which support different legal principles or
"rules." It has been suggested that there is (I) a "federal rule"
requiring notice of intention to accept to form a unilateral contract
of guaranty; (2) a "Massachusetts rule" treating notice as a condition precedent to the guarantor's duty to perform; (3) an "English rule" dispensing with notice of intention to accept altogether;
and (4) a "majority rule" exacting notice only when the language of
the offer or the surrounding circumstances should have led the
creditor to believe that the guarantor expected it.40
The labels given certain of these purported rules are misleading. The "federal rule," for instance, developed in the federal
courts when they applied general principles of law in diversity
cases.41 Today, of course, state substantive law governs. 42 Since the
use of this rule in federal diversity cases now depends on its adoption as state substantive law, it is deceptive to denominate it the
"federal rule." The "Massachusetts rule" presents similar problems; it is no longer followed in Massachusetts. 43 The "English
rule" bears an even more unfortunate name. It does not promote
clarity to refer to a rule which repudiates the concept of notice of
intention to accept as the "English rule" when the concept of such
notice originated in English law.44 Because of the inaccuracies of
these designations, the "federal rule" will be referred to as the
condition precedent theory and the "Massachusetts rule" as the
condition subsequent theory. The "English rule" will not be
alluded to at all.
The rules discerned by the treatise writers deal with two distinct issues: (1) when notice of intention to accept is necessary,
and, (2) if notice is necessary, the effect of failure to send it. The
rules pertaining to each question must be considered separately
for the true state of the authorities to be understood.

When Notice Is Necessary
Simpson correctly indicated that the majority of American
jurisdictions will consider both the terms of the offer and the
1.

40 See .ARANT, SURETYSHIP § 26 (1931) [hereinafter cited as ARANT]; SU,IPSON § 25.
,vmiston was content to note that some cases required notice and others did not. See
1 WILLISTON § 69A, at 219-21. This statement appears in all three editions of Williston.
Whenever this is the case reference will be made to Williston and citation will be to the
third edition (1957).
41 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
42 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
43 See Campbell 550-51.
44 See note 30 supra.
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surrounding circumstances in determining whether notice of intention to accept is necessary. 45 If either should suggest to the
creditor that the guarantor is uncertain whether his offer will be
accepted, most jurisdictions make notice of intention to accept a
constructive condition of the guarantor's liability.46 However, no
treatise writer has identified the minority rule as to when notice
is necessary. Simpson did not attempt to do so.47 Arant erroneously
stated that some American jurisdictions never made notice a constructive condition. 48 His cases merely indicated that neither the
majority nor the true minority rule made notice a constructive
condition of all unilateral contracts of guaranty.40
The true minority rule has been adopted at common law by
Minnesota,50 Nebraska,51 New York,52 Ohio,53 and Tennesee. 64 This
rule limits the courts to the terms of the offer in determining
whether notice is requisite. If the wording should intimate to the
creditor that the guarantor is uncertain whether his offer will be
accepted, notice will be required. Otherwise, it is unnecessary.
Other circumstances are not taken into account. 55
Virtually every American jurisdiction, including those with
statutes on the subject, 56 adheres to either the majority or minority
rule outlined above. The theoretical disagreement indicated by
these two rules, however, has seldom led to varying results in practice. There are significant facts in almost every decision requiring
or dispensing with notice which satisfactorily explain the result,
regardless of the theory enunciated by the court. This reduces the
actual area of disagreement between the majority and the minority
rule to a few minority rule cases which allow positive and unqualified words of guaranty to relieve the creditor of the duty to send
SIMPSON § 25.
E.g., Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Richards, 115 U.S. 524 (1885); Atlanta Newspapers,
Inc. v. Tyler, 104 Ga. App. 707, 122 S.E.2d 591 (1961); Black, Starr, & Frost v. Grabow,
216 Mass. 516, 104 N.E. 346 (1914).
47 SIMPSON § 25.
48 ARANT § 26, at 64.
40 Id. at 67 n.l.
50 Midland Nat'l Bank v. Security Elevator Co., 161 Minn. 30, 200 N.W. 851 (1924);
see R.EsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, MINN. ANNOT. § 56 (1934).
51 Wilcox v. Draper, 12 Neb. 138, 10 N.W. 579 (1881); see REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS,
NEB. ANNOT. § 56 (1933).
52 Union Bank v. Coster's Ex'rs, 3 N.Y. 203 (1850); see REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, N.Y.
ANNOT. § 56 (1933).
53 Powers & Weightman v. Bumcratz, 12 Ohio St. 273 (1861); see REsrATEMENT, CoN•
TRACTS, Omo ANNOT. § 56 (1933).
54 Bright v. McKni~ht, 33 Tenn. 158 (18~3).
55 E.g., Smith & Cnttenden v. Dann, 6 Hill 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844).
56 See text accompanying notes 181-87 infra.
45
46
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notice, although there are no other significant facts which justify
this result. 57 Factual analysis of the American decisions will be
undertaken below. The "rules" concerning the effect of failure to
give notice will first be examined for other areas of disagreement.

2. Effect of Failure To Give Notice
There are two theories on the effect of failure to give notice
in situations where notice is required: the condition precedent
theory and the condition subsequent theory. The former holds
that when notice is necessary58 it is a condition precedent to formation of a contract. 59 If it is not given when essential, no contract
exists between the guarantor and the creditor although the creditor
has performed the requested act. The condition subsequent theory
originated with the Massachusetts case of Bishop v. Eaton 60 and
has proved extremely attractive to academic writers. 61 Under this
theory, performance of the requested act by the creditor effects a
unilateral contract of guaranty, but the guarantor is under no
obligation to perform his promise unless he receives seasonable
notice of acceptance. Notice is needed to prevent the occurrence
of a condition subsequent which terminates the contract created by
the creditor's performance of the requested act.
Since an offer can be revoked before acceptance, the guarantor
would appear to possess the power of revocation for a longer time
under the condition precedent theory. It requires both performance of the requested act and notice of intention to accept for an
effective acceptance. Performance of the requested act alone is
67 A guaranty in the form of a bond in penal sum is a historical example. These
bonds were phrased so as to create a present indebtedness of definite amount subject
to a condition subsequent. See Klosterman v. Olcott, 25 Neb. 382, 41 N.W. 250, rev'd on
other grounds, 27 Neb. 685, 43 N.W. 422 (1899); Rochford v. Rothschild, 16 Ohio C.C.R.
287, 9 Ohio C.C. Dec. 47 (1896); accord, Snyder v. Hufdley-Pierce-Anderson Co., 23 Ohio
C.C.R. (n.s.) 599, 34 Ohio C.C. Dec. 424 (1912), afj'd, 91 Ohio St. 375, II0 N.E. 1068 (1914)
(mem.). When no other significant facts warrant dispensing with notice the majority rule
does not allow positive and unqualified words of guaranty to have that effect. See, e.g.,
Standard Sewing Mach. Co. v. Church, II N.D. 420, 92 N.W. 805 (1902).
68 The majority rule determines whether notice is necessary by examining both the terms
of the offer and the surrounding circumstances. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
The minority rule considers only the terms of the offer. See text accompanying notes
50-55 supra.
ISO Majority rule: see ARANT § 26; SIMPSON § 25; STEARNS § 4.16. Minority rule: :Beekman
v. Hale,_17 Johns. Cas. 134 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819); Stafford v. Lowe, 16 Johns. Cas. 67 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1819); Irving Trust Co. v Tourkoff, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 663 (Ohio App. 1933);
?,!'Iver v. Richardson, l M. &: S. 557, 105 Eng. Rep. 208 (1813).
60 161 Mass. 496, 500, 37 N.E. 665, 667-68 (1894) (dictum).
61 See, e.g., l CORBIN § 68; 1 WILLISTON § 69AA; Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of
Contract: Offer and Acceptance I, 48 YALE L.J. 1, 15 n.30 (1938).
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sufficient according to the condition subsequent theory. Williston
championed the latter theory for this reason. He stressed the injustice in permitting the guarantor to revoke his offer after performance by the creditor merely because notice of intention to
accept had not been dispatched. 62
Jurisdictions following the condition precedent theory are not,
however, as Draconian as the logical consequences of their theory
suggest. While their courts refer to notice as essential to the
formation of a contract, they also undoubtedly consider that commencement of performance by the creditor renders the offer irrevocable for a reasonable time. 63 The condition precedent and
condition subsequent theories are thus indistinguishable apart
from verbal formulation:
"When notice of acceptance is necessary it makes little practical difference whether the doing of the acts called for is said
to complete a contract giving rise to a duty subject to notice
as a condition precedent, or is conceived of as merely depriving
the offeror of his normal power of revocation. Under either
analysis the offeror cannot prevent imposition of a duty to pay
and it is clear that the offeree cannot recover unless notice is
given." 64
Nonetheless, strong objection has been taken to the theoretical
implications of the condition precedent theory. It has been criticized as confusing unilateral contracts with bilateral contracts,65
and as inconsistent with other propositions concerning notice of
intention to accept.66 These propositions include: (1) notice of intention to accept can be waived in the offer or by the guarantor's
subsequent conduct; (2) knowledge of acceptance by the guarantor
dispenses with notice of intention to accept; (3) in the case of a
continuing guaranty, notice may be given within a reasonable
time after the close of all transactions; (4) the guarantor is not
discharged by lack of notice when he is not injured by its absence;
(5) notice of intention to accept is not a counter-promise and does
not bind the creditor; and (6) the guarantor can revoke his promise
62 Kincheloe v. Holmes, Sturgeon & Co., 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 5 (1846); 1 WILLISTON § 69,
at 218. Protection of the offeree's reliance on an offer is a basic policy of contract law. See
1 REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932); Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936).
63 Oaks v. Weller, 13 Vt. 106, IIO•ll (1841) (dictum); see REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, KY.
ANN0T. 34 (1938); Rogers, Notice of Acceptance in Contracts of Guaranty, 5 CoLUM, L.
REV. 215, 219 (1905).
64 ARANT § 26, at 69.
65 See I WILusroN § 69A, at 221.
66 See Campbell 535.

1963]

GUARANTY CONTRACTS

67

between notification and act. It is submitted, however, that these
propositions are all reconcilable with the view that notice of intention to accept is integral to certain unilateral contracts of
guaranty.
Notice of intention to accept can be waived in the offer of
guaranty. 07 Williston suggested that this indicated that the creditor's performance completed the contract, and notice, if necessary
at all, was only a condition precedent to enforcement of the contract
against the guarantor. The parties, he pointed out, could not waive
an element required by law for formation of a contract. 68 This
argument is based on a misunderstanding of the notice requirement. The requirement is not a mandatory rule of law applicable
to all guaranties. Notice of intention to accept is a constructive
condition of some unilateral contracts of guaranty when the parties
have not provided otherwise. Notice is requisite when the terms
of the offer or the surrounding circumstances indicate that the
guarantor reasonably expects or needs it. If the offer expressly
waives notice it is clearly consonant with the rationale of the
notice requirement to respect this manifestation of intent. 69
Sending of notice of intention to accept can also be waived by
the subsequent conduct of the guarantor, e.g., by a subsequent
promise to pay. 70 Williston considered this inconsistent with the
idea that notice is a condition precedent to creation of a contract. He maintained that a "gratuitous promise" could not form a
contract that had previously failed to come into being. 71 Williston's
argument is apparently based on the doctrine of consideration. The
subsequent promise by the guarantor is typically made after credit
is extended in reliance on the offer of guaranty and after the time
for giving notice of intention to accept has elapsed. No contract
exists, since the condition precedent theory makes timely notice
a prerequisite to formation of a contract. In this situation, Williston inferentially dismisses the reliance of the creditor on the
previous offer of guaranty as consideration for the subsequent
promise. He invokes the proposition that past events are insufficient
67 E.g., Bowdan v. Gooderham & Worts, Ltd., 272 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per curiam)
(alternative holding).
08 l WILUSfON § 69AA, at 223-24.
oo In Hughes v. Roberts, Johnson & Rand Shoe Co., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2003, 72 S.W. 799
(1903) the court noted that, the defendant being sui juris, there was no legal reason why
he could not waive notice of acceptance.
70 Farwell & Co. v. Sully, 38 Iowa 387 (1874).
71 l WILLISTON § 69AA, at 223-24.
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consideration for present promises. 72 This rule, however, is subject
to exceptions. One exception furnishes analogous support for the
view that the creditor's reliance on the previous offer of guaranty
constitutes consideration for the subsequent promise to pay:
"In the early history of the common law action of assumpsit, there were a good many cases in which this action was sustained upon an express promise to pay for a past service that
had been rendered by the plaintiff at the defendant's request.
There is some, but not very much, modern authority to the
same effect." 78
Williston's criticism can also be met on other grounds. The
subsequent conduct of the guarantor which constitutes a waiver
of notice of intention to accept includes an acknowledgment of
liability74 as well as a subsequent promise. This suggests that the
guarantor's conduct perfects the original arrangement between
the parties and does not form a new contract. The subsequent
behavior of the guarantor can be interpreted as a waiver of the
defect in acceptance resulting from the creditor's failure to dispatch timely notice of intention to accept.
Williston objected to contract formation through the offeror's
waiver of a flaw in acceptance. 75 He believed that it was unfair to
permit the offeror to waive a defective acceptance since it allowed
him to speculate at the expense of the offeree. If market conditions
changed in his favor, he could assert the defect in acceptance and
make a more advantageous contract elsewhere. If market conditions changed so that the offeree had made a bad bargain, the
offeror could waive the defect in acceptance and hold him to it.
However, this line of argument is not relevant to the unilateral contract of guaranty situation. There is no question of binding the
creditor-offeree. He is not asked for a promise. The courts are concerned with protecting the creditor's reliance on the offer of
guaranty. The creditor has typically extended credit to the principal in the belief that he is secured by a guaranty, but he has lost this
security because he failed to give due notice of intention to accept.
When the guarantor indicates by his subsequent conduct that he
does not claim the release from liability afforded him by the notice
72
73

74
75

See I WILLISTON § 142, at 620-21.
l CORBIN § 233, at 764.
See City Nat'l Bank v. Phelps, 86 N.Y. 484 (1881).
1 WILLISTON § 82, at 336.
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requirement, it is reasonable to hold that he has waived the omission in the creditor's acceptance.76
Seasonable knowledge of acceptance is equivalent to receipt _of
notice of intention to accept. 77 Professor Campbell questioned
whether this was consistent with the condition precedent theory. 78
The answer is in the affirmative when the offer does not specify a
particular mode of acceptance. 79
Williston maintained that the condition precedent theory was
based on an inept analogy to the principles governing acceptance of
offers for bilateral contracts. 80 The analogy was noticeably strained,
he pointed out, since notice of acceptance of a continuing
guaranty may be given within a reasonable time after the close of
transactions. The proper time for communication of acceptance of
an offer for a bilateral contract is at the outset of transactions, not
at their close. 81 This criticism is directed at a straw man. Acceptance
analogous to that of offers for bilateral contracts is not attempted
or required. Notice of intention to accept is not a promise. Belated
notice, however, would not give the guarantor the opportunity to
protect himself which is the true foundation of the notice requirement. Thus, it is notice of transactions under a continuing guaranty which must be given within a reasonable time after the close
of transactions. 82 Notice of intention to accept must be given
earlier. 83
Williston stated that lack of notice of acceptance discharged the
guarantor only when he suffered consequent loss. 84 He then made
the point that if notice were a condition precedent to formation of
a contract the fact of injury would be immaterial. 85 The point is
well taken, but Williston misreads the cases. If notice of intention
to accept is necessary, failure to receive it does unconditionally
See 3A CORBIN § 759, at 513.
Rich v. Clayton Mark & Co., 250 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1957).
78 Campbell 535.
70 See I CORBIN § 67, at 210.
80 1 WILLisrON § 69A, at 221.
81 Id. § 69AA, at 224.
82 The cases cited by "Williston make this point with regard to notice of transactions,
not notice of intention to accept. See 1 WILLrsroN § 69AA, at 224 n.20.
83 Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne & Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113 (1833) held that notice of
intention to accept must be given within a reasonable time after acceptance. This was clarified by the statement of Mr. Justice Nelson in Louisville Mfg.. Co. v. Welch, 51 U.S. (IO
How.) 461, 475 (1850) (dictum), that notice of intention to accept should be dispatched
prior to notice of transactions at a time when the defendant's liabilities are still accruing.
84 I WrLLisroN § 69A, at 222.
85 Ibid.
76

77
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discharge the guarantor. 86 Actual loss only limits the consequences
of failure to dispatch notice of transactions or notice of default.87
Notice of intention to accept is not a promise. 88 Campbell suggested it was therefore inconsistent to treat it as a condition precedent to formation of a contract. 89 This, however, is a non sequitur.
The guarantor can make notice a condition of acceptance by
express stipulation, and the courts can achieve the same result
through the device of constructive condition. 00
The guarantor may revoke his offer after receipt of notice of
intention to accept as long as performance of the requested act has
not begun.91 Campbell thought this was also inharmonious with the
concept of notice as a condition precedent to contract formation. 02
There is no incompatibility if it is borne in mind that notice is
required, not a promise. Notice is a condition of acceptance, but it
is the requested performance that is the consideration for the
guarantor's promise. His offer remains revocable if notice alone is
given. On the other hand, if the requested performance occurs
without notice, the offer is supported by consideration and becomes irrevocable for a reasonable time. 93
The preceding analysis suggests that there is nothing unorthodox in treating notice of intention to accept as a condition precedent to the formation of certain unilateral contracts of guaranty.
The American Law Institute, however, has rejected this approach
because of its alleged deficiencies and has approved the condition
subsequent theory. 94 The virtual identity of the condition precedent and condition subsequent theories makes the ALI position
of little substantive importance except as a source of confusion.
Because the ALI action can be construed as treating the verbal
difference between the two rules as a real difference, several of the
annotations to the Restatement of Contracts indicated that the
jurisdiction surveyed adopted the condition precedent theory
86 E.g., Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Richards, 115 U.S. 524 (1885).
87 Louisville Mfg. Co. v. Welch, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 461, 474-75 (1850) (dictum). l
WILLISTON § 69A, at 222 n.14 actually cites notice of transactions and notice of default

cases.
See Campbell 535.
Ibid.
90 The English, for instance, do not question this. See SALMOND &: 'WILLIAMS, CONTRACTS
83 (2d ed. Hl45).
91 See Campbell 535.
92 Ibid.
93 Oaks v. Weller, 13 Vt. 106, 110-11 (1841) (dictum).
94 1 REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 56 (1932); REsTATEMENT, SECURITY § 86 (1941).
88
89
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and did not follow the restatement.95 The Montana annotation, for
instance, suggested that the apparent espousal by the Montana
code of the condition precedent theory rejected the restatement
approach. 00 The Oklahoma annotation, on the other hand, interpreted an identical statute as probably in accord with the restatement.07 The fog caused by the ALI position is unfortunate. There
are two theories concerning the effect of failure to give notice, but
they both lead to the same result.
C.

Factual Comparison of the American Authorities

The only substantial conflict of authority with regard to notice
of intention to accept relates to the method of determining whether
notice is necessary. Courts following the majority rule consider
both the terms of the offer and the circumstances surrounding the
offer in making this judgment. Courts adopting the minority rule
regard only the face of the offer. The following is an analysis of
what is believed to be the majority of American decisions on this
question. Significant facts in these decisions are emphasized. It is
submitted that these facts justify the result reached by the court as
to the exigency of notice in the particular case. If this is true, the
theoretical distinction between the majority and minority rule is
relatively unimportant in practice. The greater number of the
cases analyzed are reconcilable by means of the factual approach.
I. When Notice Is Necessary

Notice is required by either rule whenever the language in the
offer should indicate to the creditor that the guarantor is uncertain
whether his offer will be accepted. An offer "to whom it may concern," for instance, shows on its face that the guarantor has no
reasonable expectation that it will be accepted by a particular
creditor or by anyone at all. 08 Other examples include the following language:
Oil See, e.g., REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, ALA. ANNOT. § 56 (1937); REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, CONN. ANNOT. § 56 (1933); REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, loWA ANNOT. § 56 (1934);
REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, Mo. ANNOT. 23 (1933); REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, S.D. ANNOT.
§ 56 (1937),
06 REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, MONT. ANNOT. § 56 (1940).
07 REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, OKLA. ANNOT. § 56 (1939).
98 See Lawson v. Townes, Oliver &: Co., 2 Ala. 373 (1841); Gano v. Farmers' Bank, 103
Ky. 508, 45 S.W. 519 (1898); Mussey v. Rayner, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 223 (1839); Hill &:
Henderson v. Calvin &: Hurst, 5 Miss. (4 How.) 231 (1834); Columbia Baking &: Mfg. Co. v.
Schissler, 35 Pa. Super. 621 (1908).
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"I will, if you please, stand responsible for the payment of it,
at the time you and James may agree on." 99
"I would be willing to guarantee payment of Mr. Tourkoff's
drafts providing you would grant him ninety day terms, as it
was my understanding he requested this of you previously." 100
On the other hand, only the majority rule considers the circumstances surrounding the offer in assessing the utility of notice.
The following are typical resolutions of the question.
Unsolicited Offer. When the offer is unsolicited by the creditor, the guarantor, absent other circumstances, has no indication
that it will be accepted. 101 A classic example of an unsolicited guaranty is provided by the case of Tuckerman v. French,1°2 in which
the offer of guaranty was made on the initiative of the guarantor
without the knowledge of the principal. An offer of guaranty contained in a letter introducing the principal is more typical. 103 But
notice is usually found necessary whenever an unsolicited offer is
involved. 104
Solicitation of the guaranty by the principal does not affect the
necessity of notice. 105 The principal's request gives the guarantor
little indication whether his offer is acceptable to the creditor. Nor
does the fact that the principal requests the guarantor to execute
one of the creditor's forms dispense with notice when the creditor
did not authorize him to do so. 106 If the guarantor knows that the
creditor asked the principal to obtain his guaranty, however, the
guarantor should reasonably anticipate acceptance, and notice is
unnecessary .107
Principal Transaction Incomplete. It is not uncommon for an
99 See Beekman v. Hale,
100 See Irving Trust Co.

17 Johns. Cas. 134 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
v. Tourkoff, 13 Ohio Law Abs. 663 (Ohio App. 1933); accord,
Meyer v. Ruhstadt, 66 Ill. App. 346, 347 (1896); Central Sav. Bank v. Shine, 48 Mo. 456
(1871).
101 New Haven County Bank v. Mitchell, 15 Conn. 206, 217 (1842) (dictum).
102 7 Me. 115 (1830).
103 See McCollum v. Cushing, 22 Ark. 540 (1861); Rapelye 8: Purdy v. Bailey, 3 Conn.
438 (1820); Lowe & Co. v. Beckwith, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 150 (1853); Wardlaw, Walker 8:
Burnsides v. Harrison, 40 S.C.L. (11 Rich.) 626 (1858); Russell v. Clarke's Ex'rs, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 69, 93-94 (1812) (dictum).
104 See Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113 (1833); Smith v. Anthony,
5 Mo. 504 (1838); Taylor v. Wetmore, 10 Ohio 490 (1841); Rothchild Bros. v. Lomax, 75
Ore. 395, 146 Pac. 479 (1915); Kellogg v. Stockton & Fuller, 29 Pa. 460 (1857); Edmondston
v. Drake, 30 U.S. (5 Pct.) 624, 636-37 (1831) (dictum).
105 See Lee v. Dick, 35 U.S. (10 Pct.) 482 (1836); Winnebago Paper Mills v. Travis, 56
Minn. 480, 58 N.W. 36 (1894).
106 Sec Ladd &: Bush v. Hayes, 105 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1939); Standard Sewing Mach.
Co. v. Church, 11 N.D. 420, 92 N.W. 805 (1902).
101 See text accompanying notes 124-26 infra.
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offer of guaranty to be made before the transaction between the
creditor and the principal has been agreed upon. Indeed, if the
consideration for the guaranty is the creditor's promise to the
principal, the guaranty must be given before this promise is made.
Otherwise the creditor's promise will be a past event and insufficient consideration for the guaranty. 108 The guarantor cannot be
sure that his offer will be accepted if he knows that a contemplated
contract between the creditor and the principal has not been executed. Notice is requisite unless other circumstances should lead
the guarantor to anticipate or to learn of acceptance. 109 Asmussen
v. Post Printing & Publishing Co.,110 for instance, held notice necessary to obligate guarantors who had signed a guaranty on an
application for a newspaper agency submitted by the principal to
the creditor. There are a number of cases in accord with Asmussen,
especially if an application or order sent by the principal provides
that it is binding when accepted at the creditor's place of business. m
This provision should put the creditor on notice that the guarantor
is not likely to obtain prompt knowledge of acceptance.
Receipt of consideration from the creditor should also lead
the guarantor to anticipate acceptance.112 Thus, McConnon & Co.
v. Laursen113 held that an acknowledgment of receipt of consideration in the guaranty precluded the guarantor from introducing
evidence that the contract between the creditor and principal had
not been agreed upon when the offer of guaranty was made. 114
Intimation of Rejection. An intimation to the guarantor by
the creditor or his agent that the guaranty may not be acceptable
Tomihiro v. United Hotel Corp., 145 Ore. 629, 28 P.2d 880 (1934).
See Asmussen v. Post Printing &: Publishing Co., 26 Colo. App. 416, 143 Pac. 396
(1914); Linro Medicine Co. v. Moon, 190 Mo. App. 366, 177 S.W. 322 (1915); Coe &:
Richmond v. Buchler, 110 Pa. 366, 5 Atl. 20 (1885) (per curiam); William Deering &: Co.
v. Mortell, 21 S.D. 159, 110 N.W. 86 (1906).
110 26 Colo. App. 416, 143 Pac. 396 (1914). See also Snyder v. Click, 112 Ind. 293, 13
N.E. 581 (1887); United States Fid. &: Guar. Co. v. Riefler, 239 U.S. 17 (1915) (contract of
indemnity).
111 See Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Richards, 115 U.S. 524 (1885); Barnes Cycle Co. v.
Reed, 84 Fed. 603 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898), rev'd on other grounds, 91 Fed. 481 (3d Cir. 1899);
Greer Mach. Co. v. Sears, 119 Ky. 697, 66 S.W. 521 (1902); American Agricultural Chem. Co.
v. Ellsworth, 109 Me. 195, 83 Atl. 546 (1912); Texas Co. v. Stanberry, 165 S.W.2d 696 (Mo.
App. 1942) (per curiam); John Deere Plow Co. v. McCullough, 102 Mo. App. 458, 76 s:w.
716 (1903); Deering Harvester Co. v. Sulser, 78 Mo. App. 670 (1899); T. & H. Smith &: Co.
v. Thesmann, 20 Okla. 133, 93 Pac. 977 (1908).
112 See text accompanying note 146 infra.
113 22 N.D. 604, 135 N.W. 213 (1912).
114 Sec text accompanying notes 147-54 infra for further discussion of acknowledgment
of receipt of consideration.
108

100
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is enough to require notice of intention to accept. 115 But an intimation to the principal which is not communicated to the guarantor does not have this effect.116 The intimation of rejection must
decrease the guarantor's expectations of acceptance, but it cannot
constitute a categorical objection to his offer. 117 If it does, the
creditor's power of acceptance will be terminated,118 and the question of notice of intention to accept will not arise. In J.E. Taylor
& Co. v. Empire Lighting Fixture Co.,119 for instance, the creditor
requested the guarantor to indorse a promissory note executed by
the principal after receipt of the offer of guaranty. The guarantor
declined. It was held that the creditor could not thereafter hold
the guarantor on the guaranty without notice of intention to accept.
On the other hand, American Woolen Co. v. Moskowitz 120 did not
require notice. The creditor's overture for a more formal guaranty
was not considered to destroy the guarantor's expectations of acceptance when the original guaranty was retained and credit later
extended in reliance on it. It is significant that the formal guaranty
sought did not alter the material terms of the original offer.
Geographical Separation. When the guarantor lives a considerable distance from the creditor and the principal, notice of
intention to accept is requisite provided no other significant facts
are present.121 Conversely, if the creditor knows that the guarantor
and the principal are in close proximity, notice is not necessary. 122

2.

When Notice Is Not Necessary

Guarantor's Anticipation of Acceptance. Circumstances which
should raise a reasonable expectation of acceptance in the mind of
115 See, e.g., M. E. Smith &: Co. v. Kimble, 31 S.D. 18, 139 N.W. 348 (1913) (alternative
holding).
116 Caton v. Shaw & Tiffany, 2 Har. & Gill 13 (Md. 1827).
117 See 1 CORBIN § 84.
118 See 1 R.EsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 35, 38 (1932). The courts are unlikely to reach
this conclusion if the creditor subsequently relies on the original offer of guaranty and the
guarantor does not change his position in reliance on the intimation of rejection. See cases
cited note 120 infra.
110 273 Fed. 739 (D.C. Cir. 1921).
120 159 App. Div. 382, 144 N.Y. Supp. 532 (1913); accord, Bryant v. Food Mach. &: Chem.
Corp., 130 So. 2d 132 (Fla. App. 1961) (per curiam); Marx & Blum v. Luling Co-op Ass'n,
17 Tex. Civ. App. 408, 43 S.W. 596 (1897).
121 See Black, Starr & Frost v. Grabow, 216 Mass. 516, 104 N.E. 346 (1914); Bishop v.
Eaton, 161 Mass. 496, 37 N.E. 665 (1894); Oaks v. Weller, 13 Vt. 106 (1941); Miami County
Nat'I Bank v. Goldberg, 133 Wis. 175, 113 N.W. 391 (1907).
122 Lascelles v. Clark, 204 Mass. 362, 90 N.E. 875 (1910); see Standard Oil Co. v. Hoese,
57 Neb. 665, 78 N.W. 292 (1899) (minority rule) (guaranty indicated that both guarantor
and principal were located in Hartington, Nebraska).
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the guarantor enable him to plan for the future. The raison d'etre
for making notice a constructive condition thus disappears.
Notice is patently non-functional when the guarantor knows
that his personal guaranty is both acceptable and in proper form.
This situation occurred in Schuman v. Arsht,123 where the guarantor offered to furnish security and the creditor thereupon prepared
a guaranty which he executed. Direct solicitation of the guaranty
by the creditor has the same effect in most jurisdictions as long as
the guaranty is responsive to the request. 124 So does a request to the
principal by the creditor for a particular person's guaranty when
the desired individual furnishes a guaranty with knowledge of the
request. 125
Newman v. Streator Coal Co.126 underscores the key element
in the cases involving a request to the principal for a particular
guaranty. Notice was required in Newman although the creditor
specified an acceptable guarantor and furnished an appropriate
form. This was because the principal did not inform the guarantor
that the creditor had requested his personal guaranty, and the
guarantor was consequently uncertain whether his offer would be
accepted. The principal's knowledge that the offer would be accepted did not affect the result. The guarantor's reasonable expectations, not the principal's, are material.
When the creditor requests the principal to obtain a guaranty
but does not specify an acceptable guarantor, a different situation
is presented. Although the guarantor may know that a guaranty is
required, he does not know that his is acceptable. 127 A number of
123 249 Ill. App. 562 (1928); accord, State Nat'l Bank v. Wernicke, 185 Mich. 281, 151
N.W. 1033 {1915).
124 Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 163 La. 933, 113 So. 152 (1927); Standard
Plumbing Supply Co. v. Laconte, 277 Mass. 497, 178 N.E. 611 (1931); Drucker v. Heyl-Dia,
52 Misc. 142, 101 N.Y. Supp. 796 (Sup. Ct. 1906) (minority rule); Hunsley Paint Mfg. Co.
v. Gray, 165 S.W.2d 486 {Tex. Civ. App. 1942); see Weil v. Free State Oil Co., 200 Md. 62,
71, 87 A.2d 826, 830 (1952) (dictum). Contra, T. G. Evans & Co. v. McCormick, 167 Pa. 247,
31 At!. 563 (1895) (per curiam).
125 Frost v. Standard Metal Co., 215 Ill. 240, 74 N.E. 139 (1905); N. O. Nelson Mfg. Co.
v. Shreve, 94 Mo. App. 518, 68 S.W. 376 (1902); Royal Tailors v. Newton, 66 Utah 154,
239 Pac. 949 (1925); Bowdan v. Gooderham & Worts, Ltd., 272 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1959)
(per curiam) (alternative holding); Oklahoma City Nat'! Bank v. Ezzard, 58 Okla. 251,
159 Pac. 267 (1916) (alternative holding), afj'd per curiam on other grounds, 243 U.S. 631
(1917); see Manry v. Waxelbaum Co., 108 Ga. 14, 33 S.E. 701 (1899); Jackson v. Yandes, 7
Ind. 526 (1845); Great W. Mfg. Co. v. Porter, 103 Kan. 84, 172 Pac. 1018 (1918); Caton v.
Shaw&: Tiffany, 2 Har. & Gill 13 (Md. 1827); Lenox v. Murphy, 171 Mass. 370, 50 N.E.
644 (1898).
120 19 Ill. App. 594 (1886); see Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Knight, 86 Ore. 165, 167 Pac.
484 (1917); cf. Taylor v. Shouse, 73 Mo. 361 (1881).
127 Detroit Free Press v. Pattengill, 155 Mich. 272, 118 N.W. 927 (1908); DeCremer
v. Anderson, 113 Mich. 578, 71 N.W. 1090 (1897); Tolman Co. v. Means, 52 Mo. App. 385,
388-89 (1893) (dictum).
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cases hold notice of intention to accept essential for this reason. 128
Another group of cases dispenses with notice when the guarantor
executes the creditor's form with knowledge that the creditor
requested the principal to obtain a guaranty. 120 Since the guarantor
knows his financial condition and knows that the creditor will extend credit when a satisfactory guaranty is given, these cases apparently reason that the guarantor should be able to estimate whether
his guaranty will suffice.
Other facts may dispense with notice when the creditor requests
the principal to obtain a guaranty but does not designate a guarantor. In Niles Tool-Works Co. v. Reynolds,130 for instance, the offer
of guaranty was made on a purchase order for a single machine at
a definite price. Most jurisdictions dispense with notice when a
sum certain is guaranteed. 131 Since the guarantor knows the extent
of his potential liability, it is not considered unreasonable to require him to discover the fact of it. It is also the general rule that
notice is unnecessary when the guarantor has led the creditor to
believe that he will receive prompt knowledge of acceptance from
the principal. 132 Thus, in Lascelles v. Clark 133 notice was not essential because the guarantor had informed the creditor that he expected to go into business with the principal. The fact that he did
not do so was unimportant.
Dealings between the creditor and the guarantor, such as a
direct request by the creditor to the guarantor, can render notice
superfluous. Dealings which involve an understanding relating to
the transaction guaranteed naturally have this effect; 134 but prior
128 See Kresge Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Young, 37 A.2d 448 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1944); Milroy
v. Quinn, 69 Ind. 406 (1879); German Sav. Bank v. Drake Roofing Co., 112 Iowa 184, 83
N.W. 960 (1900); Lane Bros. Co. v. Sheinwald, 275 Mass. 96, 175 N.E. 148 (1931).
129 See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Rieffer, 239 U.S. 17 (1915) (contract of indemnity); Hartford-Aetna Nat'! Bank v. Anderson, 92 Conn. 643, 103 Atl. 845 (1918) (contract
of indemnity); Ferguson v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 93 Ga. App. 622, 92 S.E.2d 321 (1956),
transaction described in Ferguson v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 91 Ga. App. 115, 85 S.E.2d
72 (1954); Mayo v. Bloomberg, 290 Mass. 168, 195 N.E. 99 (1935); Southdale Center, Inc.
v. Lewis, 260 Minn. 430, llO N.W.2d 857 (1961) (semble) (minority rule); Stone-OrdeanWells Co. v. Helmer, 142 Minn. 263, 171 N.W. 924 (1919); Cowan v. Roberts, 134 N.C.
415, 46 S.E. 979 (1904).
130 4 App. Div. 24, 38 N.Y. Supp. 1028 (1896) (minority rule); accord, Wall v. Eccles,
61 Utah 247, 211 Pac. 702 (1922).
131 See text accompanying notes 169-76 infra.
132 See text accompanying notes 141-45 infra.
133 204 Mass. 362, 90 N.E. 875 (1910).
134 Kierulff & Ravenscroft v. Koping, 94 Cal. App. 473, 271 Pac. 353 (1928); Vacuum
Oil Co. v. Smookler, 282 Mass. 361, 185 N.E. 13 (1933); see Ferguson v. Atlanta Newspapers,
Inc., 93 Ga. App. 622, 92 S.E.2d 321 (1956), transaction described in Ferguson v. Atlanta
Newspapers, Inc., 91 Ga. App. 115, 85 S.E.2d 72 (1954); American Woolen Co. v. Moskowitz,
159 App. Div. 382, 144 N.Y. Supp. 532 (1912) (minority rule); Powers & Weightman v.
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dealings alone may be enough. In J.R. Watkins Medical Co. v.
McCall, 135 for example, the guarantors had guaranteed three successive contracts between the creditor and the principal; the court
rejected the contention that the third offer of guaranty stood in
need of notice of intention to accept.
Guaranty as Acceptance. Judges sometimes state that notice
of intention to accept is unnecessary when the creditor has asked
the guarantor for a guaranty, because the request constitutes an
offer which is accepted by the promise to guaranty. 136 They reason
that a creditor-offeror has no obligation to notify a guarantorofferee of receipt of his acceptance. 137 This explanation is fallacious
with regard to the typical unilateral contract of guaranty. The
creditor is not the offeror in the ordinary situation,1 38 so that the
guarantor's response to his request cannot be an acceptance. Notice
is dispensed with because the creditor's request should make the
guarantor anticipate acceptance.
It is likewise erroneous to justify dispensing with notice on the
ground that the guaranty is an "acceptance," when the guaranty
was sought by the creditor as partial consideration for a promise
to the principal. 139 While the guaranty does constitute a partial
acceptance of the creditor's proposal, the offer of a guaranty must
itself be accepted in accordance with its terms. Thus notice of
intention to accept could be required. It is not essential only because the creditor's offer should cause the guarantor to expect
acceptance.
It is, of course, possible for a creditor to propose a unilateral
contract of guaranty in which he would be the promisor. The
guarantor's accomplishment of the requested act, e.g., pledging a
chattel, would constitute an acceptance in this case, and, since the
guarantor is the offeree, the creditor would not be obliged to send
him notice. However, the guaranty is more likely to be an acceptance when a bilateral contract of guaranty is involved. If the
creditor promises the guarantor to extend credit in return for a
Bumcratz, 12 Ohio St. 273 (1861) (semble) (guaranty named the parties in definite terms)
(minority rule).
135 Il6 Minn. 389, 133 N.W. 966 (1911); accord, Public Fire Ins. Co. v. Weatherly, 148
Ore. 407, 412, 36 P.2d 989, 991 (1934) (dictum). But see Ladd &: Bush v. Hayes, 105 F.2d
292 (9th Cir. 1939).
136 See Campbell 538.
137 Cf. Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915).
138 See 1 CORBIN § 68, at 215.
139 See Cooke v. Orne, 37 Ill. 186 (1865); Wildes v. Savage, 29 Fed. Cas. 1226 (No.
17653) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (altemative holding).
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promise to guarantee, the guaranty is an acceptance which forms
a bilateral contract.140
Guarantor's Knowledge of Acceptance. Prompt knowledge of
acceptance enables the guarantor to know where he stands; there
is no occasion for notice of intention to accept.
Receipt of notice of transactions141 or notice of default within
a reasonable time after the creditor has entered upon performance
furnishes this knowledge. So does knowledge that the creditor has
done the requested act. 142 Detroit Free Press v. Pattengill,143 makes
it clear, however, that the latter type of knowledge must be coupled
with reasonable grounds to believe the act was performed with
intention to accept the guaranty.
If the guarantor is present at the time that the creditor performs, notice is obviously unnecessary. The guarantor, for example, might be looking on when the creditor sells the principal
goods in reliance on the guaranty144 or signs a contract with the
principal which the guaranty secures.145
Consideration moving from the creditor to the guarantor provides knowledge of intention to accept. In Barker v. Scudder, 146
for instance, the creditor sold land to the guarantor in return for
cash and the notes of a third party guaranteed as to collectibility.
Notice was not required., Transfer of the land by the creditor
manifested his intention to accept the guaranty.
Acknowledgment of receipt of consideration in the guaranty
is evidence that the guarantor has knowledge of intention to
140 Cf. Shows v. Steiner, Lohman & Frank, 175 Ala. 363, 57 So. 700 (1911), for an example of the relatively rare bilateral contract of guaranty.
141 Straight v. Wight, 60 Minn. 515, 63 N.W. 105 (1895).
142 Rich v. Clayton Mark & Co., 250 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1957); Powell v. Chicago Carpet
Co., 22 Ill. App. 409 (1887); First Nat'l Bank v. Carpenter, Stibbs & Co., 41 Iowa 518 (1875);
R. F. Grace Printing & Mfg. Co. v. Arnaud's Drug Stores, Inc., 10 La. App. 298, 121 So. 359
(1929); Menard v. Scudder, 7 La. Ann. 385 (1852); Train & Co. v. Jones, 11 Vt. 444 (1839);
see Harvey v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 Neb. 320, 76 N.W. 870 (1898).
143 155 Mich. 272, 118 N.W. 927 (1908); accord, Coe & Richmond v. Buehler, 110 Pa.
366, 5 Atl. 20 (1885). Compare Bascom v. Smith, 164 Mass. 61, 41 N.E. 130 (1895).
144 Mitchell & Bro. v. Railton, 45 Mo. App. 273 (1891).
145 Closson v. Billman, 161 Ind. 610, 69 N.E. 449 (1904). When the offer of guaranty is
appended to the contract between the principal and the creditor and bears an even date,
it is presumed that they were executed contemporaneously. Siegel & Co. v. Baily, 252 Pa.
231, 97 Atl. 401 (1916); see Beeson v. LaVasque, 144 Ark. 522, 223 S.W. 355 (1920); Davenport v. Stratton, 24 Cal. 2d 232, 149 P.2d 4 (1944); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. Badon,
17 La. App. 114, 135 So. 631 (1931); Steinberg v. Gonzales, 215 Md. 100, 135 A.2d 631
(1957); Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Jones, 61 Mo. 409 (1875); Douglass v. Howland, 24
Wend. 35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) (minority rule). But see American Agricultural Chem. Co.
v. Ellsworth, 109 Me. 195, 83 Atl. 546 (1912).
146 56 Mo. 272 (1874); see International Supply Co. v. Chem. Process Co., 190 Okla
224, 122 P .2d 137 (1942).
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accept147 if the acknowledgment affirmatively indicates that the
consideration was paid to the guarantor by the creditor. 148 The
mere words "for value received" are not adequate. 149 On the other
hand, a proper acknowledgment of consideration will be ignored
when it is fictitious. In American Agricultural Chem. Co. v. Ellsworth,150 for instance, the court disregarded an acknowledgment
of consideration with these words: "The real consideration lay
in the contract between the creditor and Berry [the principal]." 151
Since this contract had not been executed when guaranty was given,
notice of intention to accept was required. There is language in
some opinions which, contrary to the Ellsworth case, suggests that
a recital of consideration conclusively dispenses with notice. 152 It
it submitted, however, that this conclusion is seldom necessary to
the result. There are other significant facts in these decisions
which explain why notice was not required. In Davis v. Wells, 153
for example, the guaranty was given primarily to secure the
existing indebtedness of the principal.154
The Insider Rule. If the guarantor has a close relationship
with the principal which enables him to obtain inside information,
he will ordinarily be treated as though he anticipated acceptance
or gained prompt knowledge of it. This is true when the principal
is a small corporation and the guarantors are stockholders, officers
or directors,155 or where the principal is a partnership and the
147 See Davis v. Wells, 104 U.S. 159 (1881); Huckaby v. McConnon &: Co., 213 Ala.
631, 105 So. 886 (1925); Taylor v. Tolman Co., 47 Ill. App. 264 (1893); Buhrer v. Baldwin,
137 Mich. 263, 100 N.W. 468 (1904); Howe v. Nichels, 22 Me. 175 (1842) (alternative holding); Century lndem. Co. v. Bloom, 329 Mass. 508, 513, 109 N.E.2d 166, 168 (1952)
(dictum) (contract of indemnity).
148 Barnes Cycle Co. v. Reed, 84 Fed. 603 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898), rev'd on other grounds,
91 Fed. 481 (3d Cir. 1899).
140 Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Richards, 115 U.S. 524 (1885).
150 109 Me. 195, 83 Atl. 546 (1912); see Greer Mach. Co. v. Sears, 119 Ky. 697, 66 S."W.
521 (1902); Tolman Co. v. Means, 52 Mo. App. 385 (1893); Coe &: Richmond v. Buehler,
110 Pa. 366, 5 Atl. 20 (1885).
m 109 Me. 195, 198, 83 Atl. 546, 547 (1912).
152 See, e.g., Davis v. Wells, 104 U.S. 159, 167 (1881).
153 104 U.S. 159 (1881).
154 Wells, Fargo &: Co. v. Davis, 2 Utah 411 (1878), afj'd on other grounds, sub nom.
Davis v. Wells, 104 U.S. 159, 167 (1881); see text accompanying notes 169-72 infra.
165 Bond v. John V. Farwell Co., 172 Fed. 58 (6th Cir. 1909) (alternative holding) (shareholders and directors); Hibernia Bank&: Trust Co. v. Succession of Cancienne, 140 La. 969,
74 So. 267 (1917) (alternative holding) (director); see Rawleigh, Moses &: Co. v. Kornberg,
210 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1954) (officers); Thorpe v. Story, 10 Cal. 2d 104, 73 P.2d 1194 (1937)
(shareholders and directors); Sanders v. Etcherson, 36 Ga. 404 (1867) (shareholders); New
Idea Spreader Co. v. Satterfield, 45 Idaho 753, 265 Pac. 644 (1928) (directors); McGowan
v. Wells' Trustees, 184 Ky. 772, 213 S.W. 573 (1919) (shareholders and officers); Gentzel v.
Dodge, 271 Mass. 499, 17 N.E. 454 (1930) (officer); Goodhue County Nat'! Bank v. Fleming,
168 Minn. 50, 209 N.W. 533 (1926) (shareholder) (minority rule); Doebler Die Casting Co.
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guarantor is a partner. 156 It is sufficient if the guarantor has a personal interest in acceptance plus an opportunity to obtain inside
information. These individuals include: a salesman who guarantees
payment of a customer's order on which he receives a commission;157 a landlord who guarantees his tenant's debt to forestall
collection proceedings which would deprive the tenant of the ability to pay rent; 158 and the exclusive brokers or sales agents of the
principal who guarantee payment to his suppliers. 159
The offer may expressly160 or impliedly waive
161
notice.
The most common form of implied waiver is a provision

Waiver.

in the offer which deals with notice but does not specifically mention notice of intention to accept. For instance, notice has been
dispensed with when the following provisions were present:
"I also waive my rights to notice of any and all transactions
with said L. E. McKinnon and his failure to pay his indebtedness to you." 162
v. Holmes, 52 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1944) (officer) (minority rule); Wise v.
Miller, 45 Ohio St. 388, 14 N.E. 218 (1887) (shareholder) (minority rule); State Bank v.
King, 244 Pa. 29, 90 Atl. 453 (1914) (shareholders); Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 56
S.D. 410, 228 N.W. 809 (1930) (shareholders); Mountain City Mill Co. v. Lindsey, 8 Tenn.
App. 337 (1928) (shareholders) (minority rule).
156 Union Bank v. Coster's Ex'rs, 3 N.Y. 203 (1850) (semble) (minority rule); Cozzani
v. Fioravanti, 51 R.I. 433, 155 Atl. 409 (1931). Contra, Farmers' Bank v. Tatnall, 12 Del.
(7 Houst.) 287, 31 Atl. 879 (1885) (semble).
157 See Mccarroll v. Red Diamond Clothing Co., 105 Ark. 443, 151 S.W. 1012 (1912);
Richmond Paper Co. v. Bradley, ll5 Miss. 307, 75 So. 381, new trial ordered on other
grounds, II5 Miss. 534, 76 So. 544 (1917). But cf. Dondero v. Standard Emblem Co., 45 R.I.
329, 332-33, 121 Atl. 401, 402 (1923) (dictum).
158 See Greene v. Simon Brown's Sons, 128 S.C. 91, 121 S.E. 597 (1924); F. C. Palmer &:
Co. v. Chaffee, 129 Wash. 408, 225 Pac. 65 (1924).
159 See Hassell-Hughes Lumber Co. v. Jackson, 33 Tenn. App. 477, 232 S.W.2d 325
(1949) (minority rule). The insider rule is also applicable to the owner of a lot on which
a building is being constructed who guarantees his contractor's suppliers. See Vvehle v.
Baker, 97 Ga. App. Ill, 102 S.E.2d 661 (1958); Squires v. Hoffman, 278 S.'W. 803 (Mo. App.
1926); Wilcox v. Draper, 12 Neb. 138, IO N.W. 579 (1881) (minority rule). It is also applicable to an individual who guarantees payment by a principal with whom he has a profitsharing agreement. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Cassidy, 194 Ky. 81, 238 S.W. 172 (1922).
160 Hickey Pipe &: Supply Co. v. Fitzgerald, 3 Cal. App. 2d 389, 39 P.2d 472 (1934);
Guggenheimer &: Co. v. Gilmore, 29 Ga. App. 540, ll6 S.E. 67 (1923); Valley Nat'l Bank v.
Cownie, 164 Iowa 421, 145 N.W. 904 (1914); Hughes v. Roberts, Johnson & Rand Shoe Co.,
24 Ky. L. Rep. 2003, 72 S.W. 799 (1903); Industrial Bank &: Trust Co. v. Hesselberg, 195
S.W.2d 470 (Mo. 1946); Penner v. International Harvester Co., 171 Okla. 41, 41 P.2d 843
(1935); International Text Book Co. v. Mabbott, 159 Wis. 423, 150 N.W. 429 (1915).
161 If notice is lacking when required and there is no waiver, the guarantor is released
from liability on his guaranty. Texas Co. v. Stanberry, 165 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. App. 1942)
(per curiam).
162 Phillips-Boyd Pub. Co. v. McKinnon, 197 Ala. 443, 444, 73 So. 43, 44 (1916); cf.
Holmes v. Schwab &: Sons, 141 Ga. 44, 80 S.E. 313 (1913); Crittenden v. Fiske, 46 Mich. 70,
8 N.W. 714 (1881).
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"[W]e hereby hold ourselves accountable to you for the payment of the same, in case Mr. Daniel Totty should not be able
so to do, or should make default; of which default you are
required to give us reasonable and proper notice.'' 163
"I reserve the right to terminate my liability on this guarantee
by written notice thereof to the bank, except as to obligations
and indebtedness incurred by the debtor prior to such notice;
but I agree nothing shall affect my liability on this guarantee
except such notice, or the surrender or cancellation of this
guarantee by the bank."164
It appears that if the offer shows that the guarantor was noticeconscious it must expressly provide for notice of intention to accept
or it will be waived. Notice is also impliedly waived when the
guaranty states that it is unconditional1 65 or that the guarantor is
jointly or jointly and severally liable with the principal.166
Farwell & Co. v. Sully 101 signifies that a subsequent waiver is
as efficacious as a waiver in the offer. When the creditor in Sully
informed the guarantor that the principal was bankrupt, the
guarantor replied: "Prove up your claim in bankruptcy and draw
dividends. I will make my guarantee good.'' The court held that
this subsequent promise to pay put the question of notice of intention to accept out of the case. A subsequent acknowledgment
of liability is given the same effect.168
Definite Principal Performance. An offer to guaranty a single
specified transaction of definite amount does not normally require
notice of intention to accept. Smith & Crittenden v. Dann, for
163 Wadsworth v. Allen, 49 Va. (8 Gratt.) 174, 175 (1851); Platter v. Green, 26 Kan.
252 (1881) (alternative holding). But cf. David B. Taylor & Co. v. McClung's Ex'r, 7 Del.
(2 Houst.) 24 (1858).
104 See Century Indem. Co. v. Bloom, 329 Mass. 508, 109 N.E.2d 166 (1952) (contract
of indemnity); Midland Nat'l Bank v. Security Elevator Co., 161 Minn. 30, 32, 200 N.W.
851, 852 (1924).
105 Jones v. Mccannon & Co., 100 Fla. 1158, 130 So. 760 (1930); McConnon & Co. v.
Prine, 128 Miss. 192, 90 So. 730 (1922).
106 Dayton Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Sabra, 31 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1929). This result has been
justified both on the theory that a joint or joint and several promise is not a guaranty
and thus does not require notice, see Campbell 532 n.12, and on the theory that the joint
relationship between the principal and the guarantor entitles the creditor to assume that
the guarantor will be apprised of acceptance, see REsl°ATEMENT, SECURITY § 86, comment
C (1941).
167 38 Iowa 387 (1874); accord, Swisher v. Deering, 104 Ill. App. 572 (1902) (alternative
holding), aff'd on other grounds, 204 Ill. 203, 68 N.E. 517 (1903).
10s Trefethen v. Locke, 16 La. Ann. 19 (1861); City Nat'l Bank v. Phelps, 86 N.Y. 484
(1881) (minority rule); see Gunther v. Pfaffman, 18 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 311, 33 Ohio C.C.
Dec. 54 (1911), aff'd mem., 88 Ohio St. 528, 106 N.E. 1072 (1913) (minority rule); cf. Reynolds,
Byrne & Co. v. Douglass, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 497 (1838).
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instance, concerned a guaranty of a single sale in the amount of
one hundred dollars. 169 Other examples include: guaranties of
notes; 170 guaranties of payment for a specified amount of goods; 171
and guaranties of payment of existing debt. 172 Since the guarantor
can plan on the extent of his liability, most jurisdictions have found
that it is not unreasonable to require him to discover whether the
transaction has been consummated. Pennsylvania, however, seems
to require notice. T. G. Evans & Co. v. McCormick 173 held that
notice was necessary despite the guarantor's knowledge that the
principal's obligation amounted to "about seven hundred dollars."
Countervailing circumstances may make notice vital although
a definite principal performance is the subject of the guaranty. If
the guaranty is made "to whom it may concern," 174 or contains
qualified language,175 or the offeror is particularly uncertain as to
whether he is an acceptable guarantor, 176 notice may be required.
Presence of a Seal. Campbell has suggested that notice of intention to accept is unnecessary when the offer of guaranty is under
seal.177 This is an over-generalization even aside from statutory
modification of the effect of the seal. 178 Although a sealed document
is effective on delivery rather than on acceptance, delivery may be
constructively conditioned on receipt of notice of intention to
accept. 179 The guaranty in Farmer's Bank v. Tatnall,1 80 for instance,
was sealed and contained a witnessing clause. The court neverthe169 6 Hill 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844) (minority rule); see Hays v. Smith, 65 Okla. 113,
164 Pac. 470 (1916).
170 See Empire Security Co. v. Berry, 211 Ill. App. 278 (1918); Shropshire v. Smith, 37
S.W. 174, rev'd on other grounds, 37 S.W. 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
171 Pressed Radiator Co. v. Hughes, 155 Ill. App. 80 (1910); Kline v. Raymond, 70
Ind. 271 (1880); see Bank of Plant City v. Canal-Commercial Trust 8: Sav. Bank, 270 Fed.
477 (5th Cir. 1921); Murphy v. Continental Supply Co., 188 Ark. 183, 65 S.W.2d 25 (1933).
112 Winnebago Paper Mills v. Travis, 56 Minn. 480, 58 N.W. 36 (1894); Wells, Fargo
8: Co. v. Davis, 2 Utah 411 (1878), afj'd on other grounds, sub nom. Davis v. Wells, 104
U.S. 159 (1881); see Klein v. Kern, 94 Tenn. 34, 37, 28 S.W. 295, 296 (1894) (dictum)
(minority rule).
173 167 Pa. 247, 31 Atl. 563 (1895) (per curiam).
174 See Adams, Cunningham & Co. v. Jones, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 207 (1838).
175 See Meyer v. Ruhstadt, 66 Ill. App. 346 (1896).
176 See Dondero v. Standard Emblem Co., 45 R.I. 329, 332-33, 121 Atl. 401, 402 (1923)
(dictum).
177 Campbell 543-44; see United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Riefler, 239 U.S. 17 (1915)
(contract of indemnity).
178 Over half of the states no longer recognize the seal as a substitution for consideration. See Braucher, Status of the Seal Today, 9 PRAc. LAw. 97 (1963).
179 See 1 CORBIN § 245, at 812.
180 12 Del. (7 Houst.) 287, 31 Atl. 879 (1885); accord, Winnebago Paper Mills v. Travis,
56 Minn. 480, 58 N.W. 36 (1894); Acme Mfg. Co. v. Reed, 197 Pa. 359, 47 Atl. 205 (1900);
Columbia Baking & Mfg. Co. v. Schissler, 35 Pa. Super. 621 (1908).
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less held that notice was essential, stressing that the guarantor had
no assurance that his offer would be accepted.

3. Statutes
Four states currently have in effect a version of section 1539 of
David Dudley Field's Draft New York Civil Code:
"A mere offer to guaranty is not binding until notice of its
acceptance is communicated by the guarantee to the guarantor; but an absolute guaranty is binding upon the guarantor
without notice of acceptance." 181
Although this statute was drafted to express New York's version
of the minority rule, it has been construed in accord with the
majority rule. 182
California has amended the section as follows:
"Unless notice of acceptance is expressly required, an offer to
become surety may be accepted by acting upon it, or by acceptance upon other consideration. An absolute suretyship
obligation is binding upon the surety without notice of acceptance. " 183
No cases construing the California amendment have been found.
On its face, however, it appears to adopt the minority rule that the
exigency of notice turns on the wording of the offer. Two New
York minority rule cases suggest that implication of a need for
notice from the terms of the offer would constitute an express
requirement for notice within the statute.184
North Dakota has a unique statute requiring notice of intention
to accept unless the benefit of the statute is specifically renounced: 185
"In every case in which a manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor hereafter requires a present or prospective agent, salesman,
or dealer to secure the signature of a surety or guarantor to a
bond or guaranty for the purpose of delivery of merchandise
181 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 30-106 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 22-01-06 (1960); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 15, § 326 (1937); S.D. CODE § 26-0106 (1939).
182 See Standard Sewing Mach. Co. v. Church, II N.D. 420, 92 N.W. 805 (1902); William
Deering&: Co. v. Mortell, 21 S.D. 159, 110 N.W. 86 (1906); Abbott v. National Bank of
Commerce, 176 Okla. 629, 630, 56 P.2d 886, 888 (1936) (dissenting opinion). Contra, id.
at 630, 56 P.2d at 887 (dictum).
183 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2795.
184 Beckman v. Hale, 17 Johns. Cas. 134 (N.Y. Sup. CL Albany County 1819); Stafford
v. Low, 16 Johns. Cas. 67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany County 1819), as explained in Douglass v.
Howland, 24 Wend. 35, 51 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) (dictum).
185 Cf. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Vangen, 116 N.W.2d 641 (N.D. 1962).
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to such agent, salesman or dealer, such manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor shall furnish such surety or guarantor a
correct copy of the bond or obligation, together with notice
of acceptance by the manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor,
and setting forth to such surety or guarantor his right to withdraw as herein provided, either by registered or certified mail
or personal delivery prior to the first shipment of any merchandise for which such surety or guarantor might become liable." 186
A related North Dakota statute gives a statutory right of revocation
to the guarantor:
"Each surety or guarantor to any such bond or obligation shall
have ten days time after his receipt of such copy and notice
during which he may give notice either by mail or personal
delivery to the manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor of his
withdrawal from any such bond or obligation, and shall in
the event of his giving such notice of withdrawal as herein
provided incur no liability under any such bond or obligation
to such manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor." 187

4.

Conclusion

There is substantial uniformity among the American decisions
regarding notice of intention to accept. The principal theoretical
disagreement concerns the method of determining when notice is
necessary. Factual comparison of the authorities, however, indicates
that this disagreement has seldom led to varying results.
Ill.

NOTICE OF TRANSACTIONS

Notice of transactions was first considered a constructive condition of unilateral contracts of guaranty by Justice Story in Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne & Co.188 Notice of transactions was not
requisite under English law unless called for by express and explicit language. 189 Story later emphasized that the American
departure from the English position was limited to exceptional
situations.190
N.D. CENT. CODE § 22-01-06.1 (1960).
N.D. CENT. GODE § 22-01-06.2 (1960).
188 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113, 126 (1833) (dictum).
189 Somersall v. Bameby, Cro. Jae. 287, 79 Eng. Rep. 246 (K.B. 1611) (contract of
indemnity); cf. Oxley v. Young, 2 H. Bl. 613, 126 Eng. Rep. 734 (1796); see RoWLA1T,
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY 91 (3d ed. 1936).
190 See Wildes v. Savage, 29 Fed. Cas. 1226, 1230-31 (No. 17653) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839)
(dictum); see 1 STORY, CONTRACTS 359-60 (1st ed. 1844).
186
187
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The existence of the concept of notice of transactions has not
been generally recognized. Arant, Simpson, Stearns, and Williston
do not mention it. 191 The last three authors actually confused
notice of transactions with notice of intention to accept. In referring to "notice of acceptance" they stated that failure to receive
notice discharged the guarantor only when he suffered loss. The
cases they cited, however, made this point with regard to notice of
transactions, not notice of intention to accept. 192 Professor Campbell, on the other hand, found three strands of authority concerned
with notice of transactions: (I) jurisdictions which sometimes required notice of transactions; (2) jurisdictions which never did;
and (3) Massachusetts, which, under Bishop v. Eaton, 193 demanded
notice when the creditor should have known that the guarantor
would not receive prompt information concerning the creditor's
performance.194
It is submitted that Professor Campbell was substantially correct in his analysis except for the weight that he gave to Bishop v.
Eaton as a distinctive approach. Although the case has enjoyed
academic approval, 195 Bishop v. Eaton has not been widely followed.
Furthermore, subsequent Massachusetts decisions have treated it
as in accord with cases in other jurisdictions,196 as Professor Campbell was forced to concede.197
The principal theoretical division of authority consists of (I)
a rule which makes notice a constructive condition when the offer
leaves indefinite the amount of credit which may be extended;
and (2) a rule which refuses to make notice of transactions a constructive condition. There are also a few cases which indicate that
notice of transactions can be only a constructive condition of
guaranties of collection.198

A. Notice as a Constructive Condition:
The Old Majority Rule
It is doubtful whether the ensuing discussion of notice of
transactions as a constructive condition deals with living law. The
ARANT § 26; SIMPSON § 25; STEARNS §§ 4.15-.17; 1 WILLISTON §§ 69A-69AA.
See SIMPSON § 25, at 68 n.5; STEARNS at 81 n.9; 1 WILLISTON § 69A, at 22 n.14.
161 Mass. 496, 500, 37 N.E. 665, 667-68 (1894) (dictum).
Campbell 545-551.
See authorities cited note 61 supra.
See, e.g., Black, Starr &: Frost v. Grabow, 216 Mass. 516, 104 N.E. 346 (1914).
See Campbell 550.
See text accompanying notes 216-17 infra for the distinction between a guaranty of
collection and guaranty of payment.
191
192
10a
104
195
100
197
10s
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basic principles were laid down in old cases that have not been
reaffirmed. 199 Nevertheless, analysis of notice of transactions is
more than empty scholarship, for inadvertent confusion of notice
of transactions and notice of intention to accept has produced unfortunate conclusions.
The majority of American jurisdictions made notice of transactions a constructive condition when it would aid the guarantor
in planning his affairs. If the offer of guaranty left indefinite the
amount of credit for which the guarantor might ultimately become
liable within a reasonable time, notice of transactions was considered essential unless other circumstances rebutted this inference.
Notice of transactions was demanded when the guaranty was not
expressly limited either as to duration or as to the amount of credit
guaranteed; 200 when it was limited in amount of credit but not in
duration; 201 and when it was limited in duration but not in amount
of credit.202 If the guaranty was for both a limited duration and a
limited amount of credit, notice of transactions was not exacted.203
The significant facts which rendered notice of intention to
accept redundant had the same effect on notice of transactions.
Thus, if the guarantor should have anticipated the transactions
guaranteed, notice was not a constructive condition. In Caton v.
Shaw & Tiffany, 204 for example, notice was not required when the
principal had informed the guarantor that the creditor desired his
personal guaranty. Notice was also unnecessary when the guarantor
received prompt knowledge of transactions. 205 If he had a close
relationship with the principal which would enable him to obtain
inside information, e.g., he was an officer, director, or stockholder
of the principal, the guarantor was usually treated as _though he
had anticipated the transactions guaranteed or had gained prompt
See Campbell 548.
Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Mills, 55 Iowa 543, 8 N.W. 356 (1881): Clark v. Reming•
ton, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 361 (1846) (alternative holding); Lester Piano Co. v. Romney, 41
Utah 436, 126 Pac. 325 (1912) (alternative holding).
201 See Rapelye &: Purdy v. Bailey, 3 Conn. 438 (1820); M. Ferst &: Co. v. Blackwell, 39
Fla. 621, 22 So. 892 (1897); Whiting v. Stacy, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 270 (1860); Douglass v.
Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113, 126 (1832) (dictum); Beitler v. Rudkin, 104
Conn. 404, 410-12, 133 Atl. 214, 216 (1926) (dictum); Bank v. Sloo &: Byrne, 16 La. 539 (1840)
(alternative holding).
202 See Babcock v. Bryant, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 133 (1832).
20s See Wildes v. Savage, 29 Fed. Cas. 1226 (No. 17653) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839); Montgomery
v. Kellogg &: Sandusky, 43 Miss. 486 (1870).
204 2 Har. &: Gill 13 (Md. 1827).
205 Noyes &: Co. v. Nichols, 28 Vt. 159 (1855); see Menard v. Scudder, 7 La. Ann. 385
(1852).
199

200
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knowledge of them. 206 The offer of guaranty could expressly207 or
impliedly waive notice of transactions. A provision that the guaranty was in force until revoked by written notice was one form of
implied waiver. 208 Receipt of notice of default or notice of intention to accept affected the utility of notice of transactions. If
notice of default was given within the time that notice of transactions was due, the latter was rendered superfluous.200 Notice of
intention to accept usually had the same effect because it should
have led the guarantor to anticipate transactions in reliance on
the guaranty.210
The guarantor was discharged to the extent that loss followed
from delayed notice of transactions. 211 If lack of notice prevented
him from protecting his rights of recourse against the principal,
he was totally discharged.212 If it misled him into allowing special
damage to occur, he was discharged pro tanto.218
In Cremer v. Higginson 214 the principal passed from a solvent
to an insolvent condition between the time when notice should
have been received and the time that it actually was received. The
court held that the guarantor was wholly discharged. Cremer involved a situation in which courts have presumed that the guarantor was irreparably injured by tardy notice of transactions. Timely
notice would have alerted him to the extent of his possible liability
before it accrued. He could then have endeavored to protect himself from deterioration in the principal's financial condition. He
could have demanded security and been prepared to assert his
rights of subrogation, exoneration, contribution, and reimbursement immediately upon default. Because the actual amount of loss
200 See Standard Roller Bearing Co. v. Bergdoll, 214 Fed. 175 (E.D. Pa. 1914) (Louis J.
Bergdoll guarantor, Louis J. Bergdoll Motor Co. principal); Boyd &: Rickets v. Snyder, 49
Md. 325 (1878) (directors of brewing company guarantors, their agent principal); Gloucester Mut. Fishing Ins. Co. v. Boyer, 294 Mass. 35, 200 N.E. 557 (1936) (guarantors shareholders
of principal); cf. Eastern Shore Brokerage &: Comm'n Co. v. Harrison, 141 Md. 91, 118 Atl.
192 (1922).
207 New Haven County Bank v. Mitchell, 15 Conn. 206 (1842); see Merchants Nat'l
Bank v. Ayers, 37 ,vyo. 136, 259 Pac. 804 (1927). An e.xpress waiver of notice of transactions
may be considered impliedly to waive notice of intention to accept. Phillips-Boyd Pub.
Co. v. McKinnon, 197 Ala. 443, 73 So. 43 (1916).
208 Century Indem. Co. v. Bloom, 329 Mass. 508, 109 N.E.2d 166 (1952) (contract of
indemnity); Frieden v. Cluett, Peabody &: Co., 142 Va. 738, 128 S.E. 61 (1925).
::wo See Ajax Rubber Co. v. Gam, 30 Del. (7 Boyce) 479, 108 At!. 276 (1919) (per curiam).
210 See I STORY, op. cit. supra note 190, at 359-60. But see Cremer v. Higginson, 6 Fed.
Cas. 797 (No. 3383) (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (alternative holding).
211 Louisville Mfg. Co. v. Welch, 51 U.S. (IO How.) 461, 475 (1850) (dictum).
212 See Campbell 548-49.
21s See ibid.; Louisville Mfg. Co. v. Welch, 51 U.S. (IO How.) 461 (1850).
214 6 Fed. Cas. 797 (No. 3383) (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
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that the guarantor might thus have avoided was not capable of
precise determination, his interests were safeguarded by the assumption that he could have fully protected his rights of recourse and
was irreparably damaged when deprived of the opportunity to do
so. Later cases like German Sav. Bank v. Drake Roofing Co.215
established that the time at which the principal became insolvent
was crucial. In the German Sav. Bank case the principal was insolvent at the time at which notice of transactions was due. Since
the prior insolvency of the principal precluded the guarantor from
taking effective steps to protect his rights of recourse, the court
held that failure to receive prompt notice did not discharge the
guarantor. Even in this situation, however, dilatory notice of transactions could cause the guarantor to incur special damage and
obtain a pro tanto discharge. For example, he might be misled into
surrendering security in the belief that the debt had been paid by
the principal.
B.

Notice as a Constructive Condition of Guaranties of
Collection: A Questionable Rule ·

The typical guaranty is a guaranty of payment. The guarantor
undertakes to pay if the principal does not. 216 But the guarantor
may restrict his undertaking to the solvency of the principal debtor.
If he promises to pay only if payment can not be procured from
the principal by legal proceedings, his guaranty is called a guaranty
of collection.217 The Supreme Court of Kentucky declared in
McGowan v. Wells' Trustee 218 that notice of transactions might
be a constructive condition of a guaranty of collection but not of a
guaranty of payment. Alabama can also be deemed to have adopted
this view. Walker v. Forbes 219 stated that a creditor might have
to give notice of transactions to a guarantor of collection. Cahuzac
& Co. v. Samini220 found notice unnecessary with regard to a guarantor of payment.
The "rule" of the above cases is more fiction than fact. Each
would have been decided the same way under the former majority
rule. McGowan v. Wells' Trustee dispensed with notice when the
215 112 Iowa 184, 83 N.W. 960 (1900) (alternative holding); see Beebe v. Dudley, 26
N.H. 249 (1853).
216 See STEARNS § 1.5, at 5.
217 See id. at 6.
21s 184 Ky. 772, 780-81, 213 S.W. 573, 578 (1919) (dictum).
219 25 Ala. 139, 147-48 (1854) (dictum).
220 29 Ala. 288 (1856).
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guarantors were officers and directors of the principal. Cahuzac &
Co. v. Samini did likewise when notice of intention to accept had
been received. On the other hand, Walker v. Forbes demanded
notice for a guaranty unlimited in duration.
C. Notice as an Express Condition:
The New Majority Rule
Jurisdictions which do not readily require notice of intention
to accept221 should take a similar position with regard to notice
of transactions. Although all these jurisdictions do not have authority on point, this seems to be the case.222 Notice of transactions is
not called for unless the offer expressly and explicitly provides for
it. The atrophy of the old majority rule has made this the prevailing opinion. A recent Florida case, for example, approves it.223
D.

Statutes

Five states have enacted subtantially the following statute: "A
suretyship obligation is to be deemed unconditional unless its
terms import some condition precedent to the liability of the guarantor."224 Although the provision seems relevant to notice of transactions, it has been neglected by the courts.225
North Dakota has supplemented this section with a unique
provision requiring notice in certain situations unless the application of the statute is explicitly waived: 226
"In every case in which the manufacturer, wholesaler or
distributor is furnishing merchandise to any agent, salesman
or dealer whose execution of bond or obligation to such manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor has been joined in by any
surety or guarantor, such manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor shall each month during the life of such bond or
obligation furnish each such surety or guarantor either by mail
221 Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, and Tennessee imply a requirement of
notice of intention to accept only from a term of the offer. The majority of American jurisdictions also imply a requirement from circumstances surrounding the making of the offer.
222 M. Lowenstein &: Sons, Inc. v. Roselle Mfg. Co., 9 Misc. 2d 617, 171 N.Y.S.2d 7
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958), afj'd mem., 8 App. Div. 2d 592, 185 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1959); Whitney&: Schuyler v. Groot, 24 Wend. 82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840); Hassell-Hughes Lumber Co.
v. Jackson, 33 Tenn. App. 477, 232 S.W.2d 325 (1949).
223 Bryant v. Food Mach. &: Chem. Corp., 130 So. 2d 132 (Fla. App. 1961) (per curiam).
224 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2806; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 30-201 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 22-01-09 (1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 331 (1937); S.D. REv. CoDE § 26-0109 (1939).
225 See, e.g., REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, MONT. ANNOT. 28 (1940).
226 Cf. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Vangen, 116 N.W.2d 641 (N.D. 1962).
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or personal delivery a statement showing the debit and credit
items incurred and made in the account between the manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor and such agent, salesman
or dealer during the immediately preceding month and the
exact balance owing from the agent, salesman or dealer thereon
at date of such notice." 227
E. Position of the American Law Institute
Section fifty-six of the Restatement of Contracts provides:
"Where forbearance or an act other than a promise is the consideration for a promise, no notification that the act or forbearance has been given is necessary to complete the contract.
But if the offeror has no adequate means of ascertaining with
reasonable promptness and certainty that the act or forbearance has been given, and the offeree should know this, the contract is discharged unless within a reasonable time after performance of the act or forbearance, the offeree exercises
reasonable diligence to notify the offeror thereof." 228
Williston, the reporter for this section of the Restatement of Contracts, patterned it after a dictum in the celebrated Massachusetts
case of Bishop v. Eaton.229 The cases cited by the Massachusetts
court in support of the dictum dealt with notice of transactions; 230
but the court seemed to be referring to notice of intention to accept
when it stated that "notice of acceptance" should be received within
a reasonable time after performance by the creditor in order to forestall the guarantor's discharge. The significance of the resultant
221 N.D. CENT. CODE § 22-01-063. See text accompanying notes 186-87 supra for two
companion North Dakota statutes requiring notice of intention to accept and permitting
revocation of the offer of guaranty within ten days of its receipt.
228 1 REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 56 (1932). REsTATEMENT, SECURITY § 86 (1941) is
similar.
229 161 Mass. 496, 500, 37 N.E, 665, 667-68 (1894) (dictum). See 1 WILLISTON § 69AA n.15.
280 Whiting v. Stacy, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 270 (1860); Babcock v. Bryant, 29 Mass. (12
Pick.) 133 (1831); Schlessinger v. Dickinson, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 47 (1862) (alternative holding).
Although there was language in the above opinions suggesting that the guarantor would
be wholly discharged by tardy notice, the context generally made it clear that the court
was assuming that the principal had become insolvent after the creditor's failure to send
notice. The loss presumed to have been incurred by the guarantor, not mere lack of notice,
was the reason that these cases referred to total discharge.
Whiting v. Stacy is an exception. The Whiting court referred solely to the Iaches of
the creditor in giving notice as the reason for full discharge. The cases it relied on, however, all required injury to the guarantor plus belated notice for unconditional release of
the guarantor. See Bickford v. Gibbs, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 154 (1851) (notice of default);
Clark v. Remington, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 361 (1846) (alternative holding); Courtis v. Dennis,
48 Mass. (7 Met.) 510 (1844); Babcock v. Bryant, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 133 (1832).
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ambiguity differs depending on whether a temporary or a continuing guaranty is considered.
The time at which the dictum obliges the creditor to give notice
is unobjectionable in the case of a temporary guaranty. Notice of
intention to accept is due within a reasonable time after commencement of performance by the creditor; notice of transactions, within
a reasonable time after conclusion of the transaction. 231 The two
coalesce under a "one-shot" guaranty so that a single notice given
after completion of the transaction is sufficient.232 But if the dictum
refers to notice of transactions under a temporary guaranty, it is incorrect in stating that failure to receive notice completely discharges
the guarantor. As the cases cited by the Bishop v. Eaton dictum
indicate, belated notice of transactions discharges the guarantor to
the extent of resultant prejudice. Unconditional discharge only
follows from inadequate notice of intention to accept.233
The Bishop v. Eaton dictum can be criticized for both the time
at which it declares that notice is requisite and the effect that it
attributes to failure to receive notice with reference to a continuing
guaranty. If the dictum deals with notice of intention to accept, it
permits this notice after completion of the creditor's performance.
This is a departure from the precept that notice of intention to
accept should be given within a reasonable time after initiation of
performance by the creditor. If the dictum refers to notice of transactions, it states that failure to receive this notice wholly discharges
the guarantor. The accepted rule is that failure to dispatch notice
of transactions releases the guarantor to the extent of resultant loss.
When Williston wrote the Bishop v. Eaton dictum into the
Restatement of Contracts, he incorporated its vices as well as its
virtues. Section fifty-six, like the dictum, does not specify whether
it refers to notice of intention to accept or notice of transactions.
Section fifty-six, like the dictum, is more appropriate to "one-shot"
guaranties than continuing guaranties. Williston's treatise is more
helpful. The text indicates that Williston favored the dictum
largely for its espousal of the condition subsequent theory concerning notice of intention to accept. 234 Williston evidently meant to
endorse this theory in section fifty-six; he was not concerned with
notice of transactions.
231
232
233
234

See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
Sec REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, KY. ANNOT. 33 (1938).
Sec text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
Sec 1 Williston § 69A·AA, at 221-24.
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F. Conclusion
There was once a division of the American authorities with
regard to notice of transactions. Time seems to have blurred, if
not erased, its mark. The prevailing view now is that notice of transactions is not a constructive condition of contracts of guaranty.

IV. NOTICE OF DEFAULT
An American court first considered notice of default a constructive condition of contracts of guaranty in 1833.235 English law
recognized notice of default only as an express condition.236 The
subsequent conflict in the American decisions relates to unilateral
contracts of guaranty; but notice of default may also be an issue
with respect to bilateral contracts of guaranty.
There is more recognized agreement concerning notice of default than the other notice requirements. Historically, notice of
default was not made a constructive condition of guaranties of payment if the principal's obligation was certain in amount and due at
a certain time. There was a fairly even split of authority when the
guaranteed performance was uncertain in either respect. 237 The
modern trend dispenses with notice unless it is expressly and explicitly requested. When the collection of a negotiable bill or note
is guaranteed, the Uniform Commercial Code takes a similar position.238 Previously, there was general agreement at common law
that notice of the creditor's inability to collect from the principal
was a constructive condition of guaranties of collection.239
Guaranties of Collection. When a guarantor offers a guaranty
of collection he promises to pay if payment cannot be procured
from the principal by legal proceedings.240 Thus, it is notice of continuance of default after the creditor has attempted to enforce performance, not notice of the principal's original failure to pay, which
may be a constructive condition.241 Lack of due notice has been said
235 Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113 (1833), modified, 37 U.S.
Pet.) 497 (1838).
236 Brookbank. v. Taylor, Cro. Jae. 685, 79 Eng. Rep. 594 (Ex. 1624); Sommersall v.
Barneby, Cro. Jae. 287, 79 Eng. Rep. 246 (K.B. 1611) (contract of indemnity); see RoWLATI',
op. cit. supra note 189, at 143-44.
237 See SIMPSON § 41; 4 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 1237, at 3542-44 (rev. ed. 1936); REsrATEMENT, SECURITY 67-68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1940).
238 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-416(2), (5).
239 See Su,1PSON § 41.
240 See text accompanying note 217 supra.
241 Beeker v. Saunders, 28 N.C. (6 Ired.) 380 (1846) (per curiam) (semble); Bashford v.
Shaw, 4 Ohio St. 263 (1854); Woodson v. Moody, 23 Tenn. 304 (1843); Sylvester v. Downer,
18 Vt. 32 (1843); Brown v. Curtiss, 2 N.Y. 225, 228 (1849) (dictum).
(12
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to release the guarantor to the extent that he suffers consequent
loss. 242 It is relatively unlikely that such loss will occur, however, for
the creditor's inability to collect from the principal indicates that
the guarantor's rights of recourse are already impaired.243 A principal function of the notice due a guarantor of collection is to permit him to meet his obligation without unnecessary legal proceedings by the creditor.244
A number of the cases which required notice of inability to enforce performance involved guaranties of bills and notes. 245 The
Uniform Commercial Code overturns these cases when the guaranty appears on a negotiable instrument or on a piece of paper
firmly attached to it. The guarantor of collection is then regarded
as an indorser who waives formal presentment, notice of dishonor,
and protest. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law did not
contain a similar provision. 246
Guaranties of Payment. The need for dispatching notice of default to the guarantor turns on the nature of the principal's obligation. If this involves a sum certain and is due at a certain time,
notice of default is not generally requisite. 247 The guarantor has
ample information to be able to protect himself. For instance,
notice of default is virtually never required when the guarantor
secures payment of a bill or note for a sum certain with a fixed
maturity date. 248 On the other hand, notice of default may be called
for when either a negotiable or non-negotiable demand instrument
is guaranteed, since neither has a definite maturity date. 249
The Uniform Commercial Code abrogates the foregoing principles. Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, a guarantor of payment was treated as either a guarantor alone or as both a
guarantor and an unqualified indorser.250 In either event, suretySee Campbell 552.
A guarantor could, of course, surrender security in blissful ignorance of tbe creditor's
failure to collect.
244 See REsTATEMENT, SECURITY, Explanatory Notes § 134 (Tent. Draft. No. 4, 1940).
245 This is true of all tbe cases cited in note 250 supra, with tbe exception of Brown
v. Curtiss, which involved a guaranty of payment.
240 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-416(2), (5) and related comments; see 1 ANDERSON,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 668-69 (1961).
247 Sec STEARNS § 4.18.
248 See O'Neal v. Peaden, 228 Ala. 21, 151 So. 877 (1933); Gammell v. Parramore, 58
Ga. 54 (1877); Peterson v. Swanson, 259 Ill. App. 80 (1930); Allen v. Rightmere, 20 Johns.
Cas. 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823); Taylor & Williams v. Ross, 11 Tenn. 330 (1832);
Woodstock Bank v. Downer, 27 Vt. 482 (1854); accord, Ray v. Spencer, 208 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947) (negotiable bonds). But see Oxford Bank v. Haynes, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.)
423 (1829) (guarantor discharged when injured by lack of notice).
249 Cf. Whiton v. Mears, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 563 (1846).
250 See BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 59 (2d ed. 1961).
242
243
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ship rules were relevant to his liability. The Code adopts a different
approach. A guarantor of payment is considered an indorser who
waives presentment, notice of dishonor, protest, and demand on the
maker or drawee. 251 His liability appears to be governed exclusively
by the Code and not by common-law principles of suretyship.
Certainty as to the amount and time of the guaranteed performance has also dispensed with notice of default in the following
circumstances: guaranty of payment of a judgment at a certain
time; 252 guaranty of payments required by a lease253 or bailment
contract; 254 guaranty of payment for services rendered or goods
sold; 255 and guaranty of delivery at a fixed time of goods having an
ascertained value. 256
If the principal's obligation is uncertain in either time or
amount some jurisdictions make notice of default a constructive
condition of the guarantor's liability.257 The creditor is excused
from giving notice when the guarantor obtains prompt information;258 when the guarantor has a close relationship with the principal (e.g., is a director or officer of the principal) which permits
him to procure inside information; 259 and when the guaranty expressly or impliedly negatives the guarantor's desire for notice. 260
If notice is required but not given, the guarantor may be re251

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-416(1), (5) and related comments; see ANDERSON,

op.

cit. supra note 246, at 668-69.
See Frash v. Polk, 67 Ind. 55 (1879).
v. Walsh, 177 Mass. 555, 59 N.E. 440 (1901); Kratz v. Rally, 47 S.W.2d 221
(Mo. App. 1932); Weiler v. Henarie, 15 Ore. 28, 13 Pac. 614 (1887); Shore v. Lawrence, 80
W. Va. 493, 92 S.E. 729 (1917); see Dixon v. Schwartz, 205 Ill. App. 349 (1917).
254 American Taximeter Co. v. Smith, 199 N.Y. Supp. 578 (App. Term 1923) (per
curiam).
255 Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Turner, 164 Wash. 257, 2 P.2d 688 (1931); see Stewart v.
Sharp County Bank, 71 Ark. 585, 76 S.W. 1064 (1903); International Accountants' Soc'y, Inc.
v. Fell, 144 S.C. 64, 142 S.E. 34 (1928); Smith v. Ide, 3 Vt. 290 (1831).
256 Heyman v. Dooley, 77 Md. 162, 26 Atl. 117 (1893); see Hunter v. Dickinson, 29 Tenn.
37 (1849); Mallory v. Lyman, 3 Pin. 443 (Wis. 1852).
257 Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne & Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113 (1833); Cahuzac &: Co. v.
Samini, 29 Ala. 288 (1856); Taussig v. Reid, 145 Ill. 488, 30 N.E. 1032 (1893); Rankin &
Rankin v. Childs, 9 Mo. 665 (1846); McCollum v. Cushing, 22 Ark. 540 (1861) (alternative
holding); Milroy v. Quinn, 69 Ind. 406 (1879) (alternative holding); Howe v. Nickels, 22
Me. 175 (1842) (alternative holding).
258 Heberling Medicine Extract Co. v. Smith, 201 Ill. App. 126 (1916) (alternative
holding); Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Turner, 164 Wash. 257, 2 P.2d 688 (1931) (alternative
holding); see Palmer v. Schrage, 258 Mich. 560, 242 N.W. 751 (1932).
259 Mamerow v. National Lead Co., 206 Ill. 626, 69 N.E. 504 (1903) (stockholder and
director); Fort Dearborn Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 178 Ill. App. 450 (1913) (alternative holding)
(corporate secretary); see Walker v. Mississippi Menhaden Prods., Inc., 242 Miss. 856, 136
So. 2d 607 (1962) (stockholder).
260 Davis v. Wells, 104 U.S. 159 (1881); Bloom v. Bender, 48 Cal. 2d 793, 313 P.2d 568
(1957).
252

253 Welch
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leased from liability.261 If the absence of notice of default debars
the guarantor from effectively exercising his rights of recourse
against the principal, he is completely discharged. This generally
occurs when the principal is solvent at the time that notice should
have been given but becomes insolvent before it is sent.262 On the
other hand, if the principal is insolvent at the time when notice
should have been sent263 or is solvent and remains so until notice
is dispatched, 264 the guarantor's recourse is not affected by the
tardy notice. Absent special damage, he is not discharged. Special
damage, which results in a pro tanto discharge of the guarantor, includes: depreciation of security; 265 surrender of security; 266 failure
to obtain available security; 267 and wasting or disposal of assets by
the principal which the guarantor could have seized.268
The trend of authority requires notice of default only if the
guarantor expressly requests it.269 If a non-compensated surety so
stipulates he is totally discharged by lack of notice. 270 A compensated surety, however, may have to show both failure to receive
notice and actual prejudice to obtain discharge. 271
Statutes. Five states have enacted substantially identical versions
of the following provisions:
"A surety who has assumed liability for payment or performSee Campbell 561-64.
Wildes v. Savage, 29 Fed. Cas. 1226, 1231 (No. 17654) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (dictum).
263 Reynolds, Byrne &: Co. v. Douglass, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 497 (1838); Beebe v. Dudley,
26 N.H. 249 (1853); Sullivan Drew &: Co. v. Field, 118 N.C. 358, 24 S.E. 735 (1896).
264 Salisbury v. Hale, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 416 (1832); Montgomery v. Kellogg&: Sandusky,
43 Miss. 486 (1870).
205 Detroit Trust Co. v. Lange, 267 Mich. 69, 255 N.W. 320 (1934).
266 Cf. Detroit Steel Prods. Co. v. Daily Tel. Printing Co., 85 W. Va. 530, 102 S.E. 139
(1920).
261 Cf. Clark v. Remington, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 361 (1846) (alternative holding).
268 Mamerow v. National Lead Co., 206 Ill. 626, 637-40, 69 N.E. 504, 508-09 (1903)
(dictum).
260 Stewart v. Knight &: Jillson Co., 166 Ind. 498, 76 N.E. 743 (1906); Booth v. Irving
Nat'l Exch. Bank, 116 Md. 668, 82 Atl. 652 (1911); Douglass v. Howland, 24 Wend. 35
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840); Noyes&: Co. v. Nichols, 28 Vt. 159 (1855); Yancey v. Brown &: Appleton, 35 Tenn. 89, 95-97 (1855) (dictum).
270 Yama v. Sigman, 114 Colo. 323, 165 P.2d 191 (1945): Pergament v. Herrick Credit
Corp., 200 N.Y.S.2d 535, 540-41 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (dictum); accord, Lakemore Plaza, Inc. v.
Shoenterprise Corp., 188 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
271 School Dist. v. McCurley, 92 Kan. 53, 142 Pac. 1077 (1914); accord, Rose v. Ramm,
254 Mich. 259, 237 N.W. 60 (1931). Contra, Knight &: Jillson Co. v. Castle, 172 Ind. 97, 87
N.E. 976 (1909); see Wilhoit v. Furnish, 295 Ky. 356, 174 S.W.2d 515 (1943). See generally
Annot., Effect of Failure to Give Notice, or Delay in Giving Notice or Filing of Proofs of
Loss, Upon Fidelity Bond or Insurance, 23 A.L.R.2d 1065 (1952); Annot., Liability of a
Surety Company as Distinguished From That of a Gratuitous Surety, 12 A.L.R. 382 (1921).
261

262
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ance is liable to the guarantee immediately upon the default
of the principal, and without demand or notice." 272
"Where one assumes liability as a surety upon a conditional
obligation, his liability is commensurate with that of the principal, and he is not entitled to notice of default of the principal, unless he is unable, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, to acquire information of such default, and the
creditor has actual notice thereof." 273
When a guaranty of collection is involved, this statute restricts the
necessity for notice to a greater degree than the common-law
rule.274 In the case of guaranties of payment, the statute adopts the
modern rule. 275
Position of the American Law Institute. The Restatement of
Security provides:
"Subject to the rules pertaining to negotiable instruments,
the surety's obligation to the creditor is not affected by the
creditor's failure to notify him of the principal's default unless such notification is required by the terms of the surety's
contract. ''276
"Where a surety has guaranteed the collectibility of a
principal's debt, the creditor has the duty of giving the surety
reasonable notice of his inability to enforce performance, and
if such notice is not given, the surety is discharged to the extent
of resulting prejudice."277
The restatement approves the modern rule with regard to guaranties of payment. It reflects the general common-law rule concerning guaranties of collection. 278
212 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2807; MoNT. REv. CODES § 30-202 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 22·
01-10 (1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 332 (1937); S.D. CODE § 26-0110 (1939).
273 CAL. CIV. CoDE § 2808; MONT. REv. CoDES § 30-203 (1947); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 22-01-11
(1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15 § 333 (1937); S.D. CODE § 26.0111 (1939).
274 No cases applying the statute were found.
275 The cases relying on the statutory discard of the requirement of notice to a guarantor of payment would have been decided the same way in jurisdictions which recognized
notice as a constructive condition. See Kierulff &: Ravenscroft v. Koping, 94 Cal. App. 473,
271 Pac. 353 (1928) (guarantor wife of principal); McConnon &: Co. v. Laursen, 22 N.D.
604, 135 N.W. 213 (1912) (alternative holding) (no damage from lack of notice); Masters
v. Boyes, 44 Okla. 526, l45 Pac. 363 (1914) (alternative holding) (guarantors officers of
principal); Bloom v. Bender, 48 Cal. 2d 793, 799, 313 P .2d 568, 572 (1957) (dictum) (express
waiver of notice of default).
276 RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 136 (1941).
277 Id.§ 137.
278 The annotations to the Restatement of Security generally support its black letter
rule on both points. See RESTATEMENT, SECURITY, CAL. ANNOT. §§ 136-37 (1953); RESTATE•
MENT, SECURITY, KY. ANNOT. §§ 136-37 (1950); RESTATEMENT, SECURITY, NEB. ANNOT. §§ 13637 (1950); RESTATEMENT, SECURITY, R.I. ANNOT. §§ 136-37 (1953).
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Conclusion. The previous scope of agreement concerning notice
of default has perceptibly broadened in recent years. Since the new
consensus regards notice as unnecessary unless expressly and explicitly required, notice of default appears destined to join notice
of transactions among the curiosa of legal history.
V.

AsSESSMENT OF THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS

A. ·what Are the Notice Requirements?
The foregoing discussion has compared academic treatment of
the notice requirements with the cases. It has been suggested that
writers have failed to perceive the underlying agreement with reference to notice of intention to accept and have failed to recognize
notice of transactions as a distinct, if disappearing, concept. On the
other hand, the essence of notice of default has been fairly captured
by text and treatise.
The shortcomings of the academic authorities have found their
way into the Restatement of Contracts and Restatement of Security
sections dealing with notice of intention to accept. 279 This has impeded recognition of these restatements as "prima fade a correct
statement of what may be termed the general common law of the
United States."280
The following indicates one way in which section fifty-six of
the Restatement of Contracts might be redrafted to restate the law
more lucidly:
"Where forbearance or an act other than a promise is the
consideration for a promise, no notification that the act or
forbearance (has been) will be given is necessary to complete
the contract. But if the offeror has no adequate means of ascertaining with reasonable promptness and certainty that the act
or forbearance has been given, and the offeree should know
this, the contract is discharged unless within a reasonable time
after commencement of performance of the act or forbearance,
the offeree exercises reasonable diligence to notify the offeror
(thereof) of his intention to accept the offer.
270 Although § 56 of the Restatement of Contracts applies to all unilateral contracts,
it is derived from guaranty cases. See Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and
Acceptance, II, 48 YALE L.J. 779, 796 n.24 (1939). Section 86 of the Restatement of Security
is exclusively devoted to unilateral contracts of guaranty.
280 I REsrA.TEMENT, CONTRACTS xiv (1932). See notes 95-96 supra for annotations to
§ 56 of the Restatements of Contracts which suggest that it does not reflect the law of
jurisdiction surveyed. Rich v. Clayton Mark & Co., 250 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1957) similarly
states that § 86 of the Restatement of Security is not representative of Illinois law. But
see Ross v. Leberman, 298 Pa. 574, 148 Atl. 858 (1930).
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"Comment a. In the formation of a unilateral contract
where the offeror is the party making the promise, as is almost invariably the case, a compliance with the request in the
offer fulfills the double function of a manifestation of acceptance and of giving consideration. It is only in the exceptional
case where the offeror has no convenient means of ascertaining whether the requested act has been done that notification
is requisite. [Remainder omitted.]
"Comment b. Notice to Guarantor. This section has an important application in the field of suretyship. Although many
of the earlier guaranty cases requiring notice state that notice
is essential to the inception of a contract, they also recognize
that initiation of performance by the offeree causes the offer
to become irrevocable for a reasonable time. This approach
produces the same result as the second sentence of§ 56. Once
the offeree begins performance under either analysis the offeror cannot avoid imposition of a duty to pay if notice is
received and the offeree cannot recover unless notice is given.
"Comment c. Waiver.§ 56 does not apply if the parties manifest contrary intent.
"Caveat: § 56 takes no position respecting notice of performance of the requested act or forbearance." [Matter in parentheses deleted. Matter in italics supplied.]
B. What Is the Relative Significance of the Notice Requirements?
If notice of intention to accept is required but lacking, the
guarantor is unconditionally discharged. Notice of transactions and
notice of default only insulate the guarantor from actual loss. The
rationale of this distinction lies in the function which notice of
intention to accept is intended to fulfill. Justice Story found the
following reasons for requiring it: (1) notice enables the guarantor
to be vigilant with regard to the principal; (2) it aids the guarantor
in determining whether to revoke his offer; and (3) it assists the
guarantor in gauging his ability to undertake other commitments
and in regulating his financial affairs. 281 In other words, notice of
intention to accept is intended to allow the guarantor to take steps
to protect himself. If notice is not sent and the guarantor does not
take such steps, it is difficult for him to establish the resulting loss.
Damages should be proved to a reasonable certainty; yet it verges
on guesswork for the guarantor to attempt to demonstrate that he
would have revoked his offer if he had received notice and if so,
281

See Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne 8: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113, 125 (1833).
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when, or that he would have avoided specific commitments if he
had obtained prompt information. This problem of proof is circumvented by a presumption of total loss-an unconditional discharge of the guarantor. 282
Notice of transactions and notice of default do not have as great
utility as notice of intention to accept. By the time these notices
are due it is too late for the guarantor to revoke his offer. It is in
all likelihood too late for him to alter his other commitments
materially. His principal courses of action are to obtain further
security, to hold on to the security that he has, and to seek recourse
without delay. The limited usefulness of notice of transactions and
notice of default reduces the probability that the guarantor will incur substantial unprovable loss if they are not received. This justifies releasing the guarantor only if he can establish that he has sustained actual damage.

C. What Interests Do the Notice Requirements Protect?
Notice of intention to accept and notice of transactions protect
the interest of the guarantor in being able to plan his affairs. Notice
of intention to accept is more important in this respect. If the guarantor knows that his offer will be accepted he can usually provide
adequately for the future. The interest of the guarantor in being
able to plan his affairs derives, in part, from the commercial nature of
many guaranties. Businessmen have to be able to balance their books
to know where they stand.283 The interest also derives from traditional judicial concern for the uncompensated surety.284 Guaranties
are frequently given by sanguine friends of the principal in favor
of seasoned businessmen. A reminder to the former by the latter
that they have undertaken serious obligations may make them more
aware of their legal rights and liabilities. The courts are cognizant
of the Biblical adage: "He who gives surety for a stranger will smart
for it; and he who hates suretyship is secure."285
Notice of default protects the legal and equitable rights of the
guarantor. His rights of exoneration, subrogation, contribution,
282 Professor Fuller has analogously suggested that measuring the damages caused
by breach of commercial contracts by the value of the expectancy reflects the difficulty
in computing reliance losses. Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46
YALE L.J. 52, 60 (1936).
283 See Edmondston v. Drake, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 624, 637 (1831) (dictum) (per Marshall,
C.J.).
284 Stone-Ordean-Wells Co. v. Helmer, 142 Minn. 263, 265-66, 171 N.W. 924, 925, (1919)
(dictum); see STEARNS § 1.2.
285 Proverbs 11:15.
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and reimbursement are operative upon default. Prompt notice enables him to bring them into play without injurious delay. But the
importance of this notice is greatly reduced by the relative ease with
which the guarantor can obtain expeditious information about default.
On the other hand, the creditor has almost invariably relied
on the offer of guaranty. His reliance interest is of a high order. It
is closely tied to basic policies in the enforcement of promises. Yet
the courts have often supported the competing interests of the
guarantor. One reason is the ease with which the notice requirements can be waived. Since the creditor can ask that the notice
requirements be expressly excluded, he may be said to assume the
risk of possible hardship when he does not do so. Inasmuch as many
creditors exact the use of form guaranties286 which they have prepared, judicial insistence on notice requirements which are not
waived by the forms is buttressed by the contra proferentem rule of
construction.

D. Are the Notice Requirements Theoretically Justifiable?
Contractual theory helps to explain judicial preference for the
interests of the guarantor when the guaranty does not mention
notice. Although the notice requirements seem to be exceptions to
generally accepted principles concerning formation and discharge
of contracts, they reflect other recognized principles.
The traditional approach is that an offer for a bilateral contract
requires communication of intention to accept by the offeree, but
that an offer for a unilateral contract does not. The argument has
been made that requiring notice of intention to accept exemplifies
"modern tendencies toward obliterating the distinction between
unilateral and bilateral contracts."287 While notice of intention to
accept does modify a legal incident of the traditional unilateral contract, it is submitted that it is not of the same order as other modifications.
A unilateral contract is based on the exchange of a promise for
an act. Its traditional legal incidents are (1) the offeror can withdraw his offer at any time before the requested act has been completely performed; (2) the offeree has the option of performing or
See 2 PATON, DIGEST 1945 (2d ed. 1942).
Saxena, Selected Modern Problems in Offer and Acceptance: A Comparative Study
of the Law of India, England, and the United States 70 (1961) (unpublished thesis in Cornell
University Library).
286
287
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refusing to perform the requested act; and (3) communication of
acceptance is unnecessary. 288 These incidents have come under
searching criticism in recent years.
The traditional unilateral contract did not protect an offeree
who had commenced performance against revocation by the offeror.
The modern tendency is to safeguard the offeree by making an offer
for a unilateral contract irrevocable after part performance.289
The traditional unilateral contract gave an offeree who had
begun performance the opportunity to speculate at the expense of
the offeror. If market conditions became favorable, he could complete performance. If they turned unfavorable, he could abandon
it. This occasion for speculation is enhanced by the modern tendency to consider an offer for a unilateral contract irrevocable after
part performance by the offeree. Under this view part performance
by the offeree deprives the offeror of the power to revoke while the
offeree retains unfettered freedom to forsake performance.
The Sales Article of the Uniform Commercial Code contains
a provision designed to correct this imbalance by limiting the time.
for speculation by the offeree.290 Subsection 2-206(2) provides:
"Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as having
lapsed before acceptance."291
This subsection leaves an offeree who has given seasonable notice
free to abandon performance. But if he elects to complete performance and has not given due notice the offeror has the option of
treating the offer as rejected.
The traditional unilateral contract did not stand in need of
notice of acceptance. The offeror had no use for it since he customarily received, or could obtain, prompt knowledge of acceptance.292 This was not true of a unilateral contract of guaranty.
Since the creditor accepted by dealing with the principal, a third
party, there was no assurance that the guarantor would learn of
acceptance in time to plan his affairs. Thus the concept of notice
of intention to accept was conceived in order to aid the guarantor~
All three modifications of the traditional unilateral contract can:.
288
289
200
201
202

See id. at 34.
See I REsTATEMENT, CONTRACfS § 45 (1932).
See HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 8 (ALI &:
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2·206(2) (1958).
See 1 REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 56, comment a

ABA

pamphlet

(1932).

1958).
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be dispensed with by express agreement. Notice of intention to accept, however, is materially different from the other two.
The tendency to make an offer for a unilateral contract irrevocable after part performance by the offeree is an innovation which
applies to all offers for unilateral contracts. Subsection 2-206(2) of
the Uniform Commercial Code is a variation which embraces all
offers within the scope of the Sales Article of the Code. On the
other hand, notice of intention to accept is neither a novelty nor a
concept of across-the-board latitude. It can be satisfactorily explained as an application of the following generally accepted principles concerning notice to certain unilateral contracts of guaranty.
"Notice need not be given to a promisor who has the same or
subtantially equivalent sources of information with respect to
the facts or events ... as those that are available to the promisee. If the promisor can find out the facts for himself as easily
as the promisee can find them out and give notice of them, the
giving of notice will not be a condition precedent to the promisor' s duty of performance, unless he has clearly so specified in
... [his offer]. If, on the other hand, the sources of information
available to the two parties are not equivalent and it is much
more difficult for the promisor to find out facts for himself
than it is for the promisee to find out and give notice, it should
usually be held that the giving of notice to the promisor is, by
construction of law, a condition precedent to his duty to perform. It is obvious that this latter rule involves questions of
degree." 293
The significant facts examined in the sections dealing with the
specific notice requirements relate in part to the adequacy of the
guarantor's sources of information concerning acceptance. Certain
of these facts should indicate to the creditor whether, in the light
of his sources of information, the guarantor can speedily ascertain
whether his offer has been accepted. For example, when the guarantor is a director or an officer of the principal, or a stockholder
who has the legal right294 as well as the factual power to inspect the
books, his sources of information obviously suffice. On the other
hand, if the guarantor is in the West Indies and the principal and
the creditor are in New York, the guarantor's sources of information may well be inadequate.295 There exists an area between such
extremes in which a policy decision must be made concerning the
293
294
295

3A CORBIN § 724, at 386.
See HENN, CORPORATIONS § 201 (1961).
See Black, Starr & Frost v. Grabow, 216 Mass. 516, 104 N.E. 346 (1914).
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necessity of notice of intention to accept. The Restatement of
Contracts states that it should be required only in an "exceptional
case." 296 It has been suggested that this restricts the notice requirement to situations in which the creditor knows that the guarantor
cannot obtain information from the principal. If the creditor
knows, for instance, that the principal himself has not learned
about performance of the requested act or, although he does know
of it, has concealed this information from the guarantor, notice is
essential. 287
While notice should be required in these situations, it may be
desirable in others as well. The significant facts discussed above also
relate to the creditor's reasonable expectations concerning the guarantor's anticipation of acceptance. Notice of intention to accept,
unless expressly or impliedly waived, has historically been requisite
when the creditor should know that the guarantor is unsure that his
offer will be accepted, as well as when the creditor should know that
the guarantor cannot promptly obtain data concerning acceptance
from the principal. The crucial question is not whether the principal has and is willing to divulge information, but whether the
guarantor both stands ready to and can secure the news quickly.
To the extent that the necessity of notice of intention to accept
turns on the information readily available to the guarantor, it is
not surprising that the concept developed and flourished in the
nineteenth century, when communications were relatively undeveloped. In 1825, when a guarantor in Charleston, South Carolina, gave the principal a guaranty which was to be used in Havana,
Cuba, the creditor should have known that the guarantor could not
obtain adequate information regarding acceptance. 298 The highly
developed communications of today unquestionably alter the situation. In the vast majority of situations the guarantor should be able
to contact the principal without undue delay. The revolution in
communications also minimizes the importance of the guarantor's
uncertainty as to whether his offer will be accepted. His lack of
assurance can often be dissipated by the simple expedient of picking up a telephone or sending a telegram. The improvement in
communications may explain why most of the cases dealing with
notice of intention to accept are old ones. A plausible argument can
be made that the significance of the concept vanished with the clipper ship and the pony express.
200 l REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 56, comment a (1932).
201 See Campbell 547.
208 See Edmondston v. Drake, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 624 (1831).
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The limited modern importance of notice of intention to accept
raises the question whether the Restatement of Contracts Second
should contain the present section fifty-six even in recast form.
Perhaps the Biblical admonition to put new wine into new wineskins299 should be followed. Deletion of section fifty-six and the
addition of an appropriate illustration to the section of the Restatement of Contracts which defines "constructive condition" should
suffice. If this is done, section eighty-six should likewise be excised
from the Restatement of Security Second.
Notice of transactions and notice of default are also explainable
in terms of notice theory. Their continued utility, however, is even
more doubtful.3° 0 Once notice of intention to accept is required or
dispensed with, there would appear little need for other constructive conditions. The guarantor should ordinarily be able to find
out whatever else he needs to know.
299

Matthew 9:17.
aoo This contention has been disputed. An early writer, for instance, rated notice of
transactions as more important than notice of intention to accept. Rogers, Notice of
Acceptance in Contracts of Guaranty, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 215, 224 (1905). Simpson has sug•
gested that notice of default should be given all guarantors in order to facilitate payment
of claims without unnecessary litigation. SIMPSON 168-69. Such proposals deserve considera•
tion; but the historical common-law concepts of notice of transactions and notice of default
should not be revitalized. Their wane is a genuine reflection of the notice theory upon
which they are based. If novel uses of notice of transactions or notice of default are found
desirable they should be enacted in statutes devoid of the labyrinthine characteristics of
the common-law notice requirements. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 22-01-06.1 to 22-01-06.3
(1960); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206(2).

